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FIGHTING MUNICIPAL ECONOMIC WOES WITH PLANNING
AND LAND USE TOOLS: LAND BANKING TO PROMOTE
URBAN SHRINKAGE; A PROPOSAL
SUSAN HEDGES PATTON*
INTRODUCTION
Many large, older cities are losing population1 despite a na-
tional trend toward metropolitan growth.2 Tax revenues necessary
to provide services' and maintain the public infrastructure 4 are
lost as individuals and businesses opt for other locations.5 Reasons
* Law clerk to the Hon. Cornelia G. Kennedy, United States Court of Appeals, Sixth
Circuit. B.A., University of Michigan, 1973; M.A. Wayne State University, 1976; J.D. Wayne
State University, 1979.
1. U.S. PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE NEWS, BULL. No. CB81-92,
THREE CITIES OF 100,000 OR MORE AT LEAST DOUBLED POPULATION BETWEEN 1970 AND
1980, CENSUS BUREAU REPORTS (June 3, 1981). An awesome regional shift in population from
the industrial northeast to the sunbelt in the south and west has taken place since the early
1960's. U.S. PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE NEWS, BULL. No. CB81-62,
MAJOR METROPOLITAN COMPLEXES SHOW SLOWER OVERALL POPULATION GROWTH DURING
1970's: 1980 CENSUS ANALYSIS REVEALS (April 8, 1981); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON THE CITY OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON BANK-
ING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., How CITIES CAN GROW OLD GRACE-
FULLY 5 (Comm. Print 1977)(employment and earnings statistics) [hereinafter cited as 1977
Comm. Print]. See also, Thompson, Economic Processes and Employment Problems in De-
clining Metropolitan Areas, in POST INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: METROPOLITAN DECLINE AND I1-
TERREGIONAL JOB SHIFTS (G. Sternlieb & J. Hughes ed. 1975) [hereinafter POST INDUSTRIAL
AMERICA].
2. Despite this trend, between 1970-1974, large metropolitan areas, while growing, have
changed from the rapid growth of the 1960's to slow growth in the 1970's. U.S.-PUBLIC IN-
FORMATION OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE NEWS, BULL. No. CB81-62, supra note 1. See 1977
Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 21 (Exhibits 10 & 11).
3. Services include such activities as police, fire protection, trash collection, bus and
other transportation facilities, libraries, schools, health care facilities, social services, etc.
4. Infrastructure includes public utilities, in place transportation systems (rail, sub-
ways), sewage treatment, municipal buildings, public schools, parks, municipal housing
stock, commercial space (such as downtown shopping centers), residences, store fronts, in-
dustrial plants, and office space.
5. T. MULLER, GROWING AND DECLINING URBAN AREAs-A FISCAL COMPARISON (The Ur-
ban Institute 1975); Muller, Service Costs in the Declining City, in 1977 Comm. Print,
supra note 1, at 122-27. See generally Trolley, Graves & Gardner, The Urban Growth Ques-
tion, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 211 (1979); Keyes, Channeling Metropolitan Growth: In
What Direction, Toward Which End?, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 239 (1979).
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for this flight are manifold. High unemployment rates cause indi-
viduals to relocate elsewhere, especially in the booming South.6 In-
dividuals who can afford to move are no longer willing to cope with
high housing costs, overcrowded urban school systems, aged physi-
cal facilities, crime and racial conflicts.7 Some businesses flee cen-
tral city locations because of high taxes,' obsolete physical plants,9
lack of open space for growth,10 and problems in attracting quali-
fied personnel from a shrinking employment base.11 Other busi-
nesses, such as the automotive industry in Detroit and the steel
industries in Gary and Pittsburgh, have collapsed or shrunk in size
due to high inflation, energy costs, a recessionary economy and stiff
foreign competition. Life style preferences and energy costs draw
some individuals back to the cities.12 Businesses are coaxed with
tax breaks and other amenities. 13 Reverse migration, however, is
6. Outmigration extends beyond the suburbs to other regions of the country and to
foreign nations, especially among businesses. Reuss, Forward, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra
note 1, at viii. See also Berry, The Decline of the Aging Metropolis: Cultural Bases and
Social Process, in POST INDUSTA AMERCA, supra note 1, at 175-77 (the author writes
about an additional factor, the tendency to leave areas thought of as socially or environmen-
tally undesirable for greener areas); Sternlieb & Hughes, New Regional and Metropolitan
Realities in America, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 28 (exhibit 17); Breckenfeld,
How Cities Can Cope With Shrinkage, id. at 113. Patterns of employment change away
from the north and east into the south and west are shown by the U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
BUREAu OF LABOR STATIsTIcs, reprinted in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 8 (exhibit 2)
(regional growth shares of total employment change: 1960-1975), at 9 (exhibit 3) (manufac-
turing employment change: 1960-1970 by region and division), at 11 (exhibit 4) (regional
growth shares of manufacturing employment change: 1960-1975).
7. Reuss, Forward, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at viii.
8. Sternlieb & Hughes, Prologue, POST INDUSTRLm AMERICA, supra note 1, at 13. See
also Albin, Complexity and the Case for Large Cities, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1,
at 62; Breckenfeld, How Cities Can Cope With Shrinkage, id. at 113-14. Between 1950 and
1975, New York lost one half of its manufacturing jobs, largely due to the heavy tax burden
imposed on businesses. New York's Temporary Commission on City Finances (Dec. 1978),
cited in Breckenfeld, How Cities Can Cope With Shrinkage, id. at 113.
9. Note, Public Land Banking: A New Praxis for Urban Growth, 23 CAsE W. RES. L.
REv. 897, 915-16 (1972) [hereinafter Public Land Banking].
10. Id.
11. While there is high unemployment in central city areas, this is in part due to the
poor educational background and lack of skills many central city residents have. See
Thompson, POST INDUsTRIAL AMERICA, supra note 1, at 190-91, 194-95.
12. Muller, Service Costs in the Declining City, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at
130; Reuss, Forward, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at vii.
13. Coaxing, however, is not confined to central cities. See Kravitz, The Other Neigh-
borhoods-Building Community Institutions, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 91;
Albin, Complexity and the Case for Larger Cities, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 63.
For some heartening examples of urban renaissance, see Breckenfeld, How Cities Can
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minimal.14
. Since revenues are generated from city taxes on individual and
business incomes, loss of these revenues from outward migration
substantially impairs a city's ability to pay for the services and fa-
cilities its residents require."' The option of leaving central cities
lies more with those individuals who are economically productive
and form a part of the city's tax base." Many of those left behind
are the urban poor1 who drain a city's resources by demanding
facilities and services without contributing proportionately to their
cost."' This results in an economic and fiscal crisis in cities where
local government does not receive enough income, through tax rev-
enues or grants, to sustain city services at the level expected by
their residents. 19
Cope With Shrinkage, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 105 (Pittsburgh, Minneapolis
and Boston).
14. Thompson, Land Management Strategies for Central City Depopulation, in 1977
Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 67, 68. Since the demand for services created by the immigra-
tion of younger couples is small, this inflow of people makes an insignificant dent in reduc-
ing the cost of services. See Muller, Service Costs in the Declining City, id. at 130.
15. Muller, Service Costs in Declining Cities, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at
122-23; Sternlieb & Hughes, New Regional and Metropolitan Realities of America, in 1977
Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 28. High per capita costs are incurred in providing services to
urban areas. Wages and fringe benefits tend to be high and the costs of social services
greater as population density increases. Muller, Service Costs in the Declining City, in 1977
Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 120-21. T. MULLER & G. PETERSON, ECONOMIC AND FISCAL
COSTS (1976); T. MULLER, supra note 5.
16. Sternlieb & Hughes, New Regional and Metropolitan Realities of America, in 1977
Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 26 (exhibit 15). See also Thompson, Land Management
Strategies for Central City Depopulation, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 77. "[T]he
exodus has progressed in general by order of income (from the top down), central cities have
long ago lost those who pay more in taxes than they cost in public services, and the point
has now been reached in the parade of out-migrants where those passing the central city
limits are fiscal break-even households or lower." Id.
17. Many of the urban poor are unskilled and therefore lack the mobility to go else-
where. Mobility is also reduced by the formalities and waiting lines that attend seeking new
subsidized housing. The welfare program also locks in the urban poor because they must
remain in certain locations in order to secure welfare benefits.
18. Albin, Complexity and the Case for Large Cities, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note
1, at 63.
19. Starr, Making New York smaller, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1976, §6(Magazine), at 32;
Bulkeley, Troubled City: How Cash Pinch Erodes Detroit's Civic Amenities, Wall St. J.,
July 25, 1975, at 1, 17; Bahl, Perspectives on a National Urban Policy, in 1977 Comm.
Print, supra note 1, at 153. See also R. BAHL, A. CAMPBELL & D. GREYrAK, TAXES, EXPENDI-
TURES, AND THE EcONoMIc BASE: CASE STUDY OF NEW YORK CITY (1974). See generally City
Financial Emergencies: The Intergovernmental Dimensions, Rep. No. A-42, Advisory
Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations (1973); Greenberg, Municipal Bankruptcy: Some
Basic Aspects, 10 URB. LAW. 266 (1978).
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Given this trend toward outward movement and its impact on
the municipal budget and urban economic vitality, three choices
are available to larger cities.20 Local government can simply acqui-
esce in urban decline,21 try to reverse the trend by a massive infu-
sion of public funds and private incentives, 22  or anticipate
shrinkage, plan for it and develop innovative techniques to cope
with less.23 City planners must consider these alternatives in light
of the unique political, legal, financial, and organizational problems
that each city faces. This paper will explore the feasibility of a
"clustering and clearing" approach to planned shrinkage, with an
emphasis on the land use techniques available to accelerate
shrinkage. First, some traditional tools for coping with urban de-
cline will be discussed. Second, the concept of planned shrinkage
will be introduced. Third, this paper will suggest land banking as
the planning tool most likely to achieve clearing in areas of high
abandonment. Finally, the benefits and limitations of other land
use techniques will be discussed. Important political and humani-
tarian limitations to a program of planned shrinkage are outside
the scope of this paper.
I. TOOLS FOR COPING WITH URBAN DECLINE
A critical problem created by urban exodus unaccompanied by
redevelopment is a shrunken municipal tax base and a financial
inability to keep pace with outlays for municipal services. 24 Munic-
ipal expenditures have exceeded income since 1955.25 The balance
20. Starr, Making New York smaller, supra note 19, at 32. See also Reuss, Forward, in
1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at viii.
21. See Reuss, Forward, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at viii. Acquiescence in the
decline of older metropolitan areas would be costly and in callous disregard of those individ-
uals who continue to reside in them. Thompson, Land Management Strategies for Central
City Depopulation, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 67. Much of the existing central
city infrastructure has a long period of useful life left. To the extent that it is duplicated
unnecessarily in the metropolitan fringe, much of its usefulness goes unrealized. As energy,
construction and labor costs increase it makes increasing sense to recycle these pre-existing
structures. Id.
22. Thompson, id. at 67. Tax base sharing is a possible solution. See Susskind, Revenue
Sharing and the Lessons of the New Federalism, 8 URB. L. ANN. 33 (1971).
23. Starr, Making New York smaller, supra note 19, at 32.
24. Muller, Service Costs in the Declining City, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at
119. NEWSWEEK, May 4, 1981, at 30-35 (NYC, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, St. Louis
and Philadelphia); Hertzberg; Balancing Act-New York's Finances Improve-but at a
Cost of Decline in Services. Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
25. Muller, Service Costs in the Declining City, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at
[Vol. 30268
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between municipal income and expenditures may be restored in
several ways; increasing the tax rate, obtaining additional federal
and state subsidies and grants, or making services more efficient
and economical.
The most immediate possibility for restoring this balance is
through increased federal subsidies and grants.26 Federal commit-
ment to the economic revitalization of cities, in principal, if not in
funding, is reflected in the policies behind the Urban Development
Action Grant Program, the Community Development Block
Grant Program,28 the Public Works and Economic Development
Act of 1965,29 the Community Facilities and Advance Land Acqui-
sition Act,30 the Small Business Administration Act, 1 the Urban
Mass Transportation Act,3 2 and others. Federal grants and subsi-
dies essentially allocate income from the middle class suburbs to
the poorer cities. The benefit of this approach is that relief is rela-
tively immediate and services need not be withdrawn or reduced.
Although this is feasible as a means of helping cities make the
transition to a smaller size, limits to the public purse and a belief
122.
26. NEWSWEEK, May 4, 1981, at 29. It is estimated that states and local governments
receive around seventy billion dollars yearly in federal aid. Over $450 billion had been spent
as of 1977. Ironically, other non-urban subsidies and policies may have cut against revitali-
zation of the inner cities. More than any specific urban program, federal subsidies and regu-
lations for housing, transportation and energy have changed the relative cost of doing busi-
ness between regions and between cities and their suburbs. See Kasoff, Managing the City
of the Future, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1; Kasoff, The Urban Impact of Federal
Policies, in NAToNS CrriEs, Nov., 1977, at 29.
27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5318 (Supp. 1980). The goal of the Urban Development Action Grant
program is to aid financially distressed cities by strengthening their economic base. 42
U.S.C.A. §5301(c) articulates the objectives of the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974. A new objective was added by the 1977 amendments to the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1974; "the alleviation of physical and economic distress through
the stimulation of private investment and community revitalization in areas with population
outmigration or a stagnating or declining tax base." 42 U.S.C.A. § 5301(c)(8)(Supp. 1981).
See generally Greene, Urban Development Action Grants: Federal Carrots for Private Eco-
nomic Revitalization of Depressed Urban Areas, 3 URB. LAW & POL. 235 (1980).
28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5305 (Supp. 1981). See generally Salsich, Community Develop-
ment-Some Reflections in the Latest Federal Initiative, 19 ST. Lotus U.L.J. 293 (1975);
Maffin, Community Development: An Appraisal, 32 J. HoUSING 411 (1975); Keating & Le-
Gates, Who Should Benefit from the Community Development Block Grant Program?, 10
URB. LAW. 701 (1978).
29. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121-3246h (1976).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101-3108 (1976).
31. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 631-647 (Supp. 1980).
32. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1618 (Supp. 1980).
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that cities should take steps to help themselves militate against a
dependence on municipal welfare in the long run.33
To the extent that federal grant-in-aid programs are available
for public welfare assistance, educational support, community de-
velopment or low cost housing, cities may be limited in their abil-
ity to qualify for federal financial assistance because of specific
conditions or requirements attached to these programs.3 ' State or
local governments may be required to contribute to the project
cost by matching the amount of money the federal government is
willing to contribute. Finite municipal resources may make this
difficult or impossible.3 5 Inability to obtain a suitable leveraging
ratio, the number of private investment dollars in relation to the
federal contributions, may restrict federal grants to cities for urban
projects." Conditions, such as requiring bilingual teachers to be
provided as a condition precedent to federal aid to education, may
be difficult to satisfy due to the unavailability of qualified person-
nel. Even general revenue sharing allocations are subject to some
limitations and conditions imposed by the federal government
which the city may have trouble meeting.
State assistance in the form of grants or loans is a means of
restoring the balance between municipal expenditures and income
in distressed municipalities. Taxpayer revolt coupled with public
emphasis on economy and self-help suggest that state monies to
meet the cost of municipal services are unlikely on anything other
than an emergency basis.-7 Municipal property taxes and other
revenues are already committed to financing current operating ex-
penses. Significant increases in local property taxes are unlikely in
light of voter resistance and the deleterious effects any such in-
crease would have in further accelerating migration from impover-
ished cities. Municipal revenue raising techniques such as general
33. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1977, at A-1 (statement of Senator Proxmire). Cf. NEWSWEEK,
May 4, 1981, at 27-29. (One argument is that federal monies are merely the return of tax
monies to the cities.) See also note 168, infra.
34. Note, Federal Conditional Spending Power: A Search for Limits, 70 Nw. U. L.
REv. 293 (1975).
35. See Miller, Economics of Matching Grants: The ABC Highway Program, 27 NAT'L
TAx J. 221 (1974).
36. The leveraging ratio is an important criterion in selecting projects to receive federal
assistance. 24 C.F.R. § 570.457(e)(1980). Projects receiving financial assistance from the
state or other public entities receive more favorable consideration by HUD. Id. §§ 570.457(f
& (g).
37. See note 19 supra.
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obligation bonds secured by ad valorem or property taxes and tax
increment financing are inappropriate for dealing with deficits.
Both are means of financing capital improvements or funding
redevelopment. 8
Private economic redevelopment is a superior alternative to
federal and state funding. A package of tax and other incentives
may be created to lure back business and promote overall eco-
nomic vitality. 9 The benefits of this approach are twofold. Tax
revenues would be increased as large industries are coaxed back to
central cities with tax incentives. Their employees would be sub-
ject to individual income tax. Smaller neighborhood businesses
made possible through minority and small business loans would
also generate taxable income. 40 Spin-off businesses, which provide
goods and services to larger projects, and their employees would
increase municipal tax revenues. In addition, social services would
be reduced as employment opportunities increased. Private eco-
nomic redevelopment is certainly the utopian solution, but it has
neither worked on a large scale in the cities that have tried it, nor
is it likely to do so in the future. 1
The attempts of many cities to promote private economic re-
development are frustrated by their inability to use a scarce mu-
nicipal resource and by-product of outward migration, vacant land.
Redevelopment, particularly with respect to heavy industry, is ex-
tremely difficult in large, older cities because of the unavailability
of large tracts of undeveloped land upon which new, technologi-
cally competitive facilities may be erected. While the overall den-
sity of business and industry decreases as a result of business clo-
38. See generally Note, Urban Redevelopment: Utilization of Tax Increment Financ-
ing, 19 WASHBURN L. J. 536 (1980).
39. Anderson, Angling for Capital, Wall St. J., July 11, 1975, at 1, col. 6. See generally
Parker, Adding Human Potential to Urban Economic Development, 1977 Comm. Print,
supra note 1, at 171; America, Economic Development in Afro-America, id. at 181.
40. 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(k) (1976).
41. See generally W. THOMPSON, A PREFACE TO URBAN ECONOMICS (1965). Most of the
problems stem from inconsistent government positions on a variety of levels. For example, a
New York City program offering tax abatements to incoming business was successful in
bringing 5,000 new jobs between 1977 and 1979. These gains, however, were offset by gov-
ernment layoffs of over 40,000 employees, leaving the city with a net loss of 35,000 jobs just
from these two situations alone. Many new businesses lured into central cities are profes-
sional firms or firms requiring the services of skilled personnel. These businesses, while they




sure or outward migration, the geographical pattern that results is
a patchwork of vacant and occupied land. Redevelopment opportu-
nities are lost by a city's inability to aggregate vacant parcels into a
sufficiently large package to attract new industry or to retain ex-
isting industry operating out of obsolete facilities.
Several factors account for the sluggishness of the central city
economy. First, the economic health of large cities is tied to the
overall health of the national economy.42 Decreases in the rate of
economic growth on a national level are mirrored locally. Second,
increases in real income following the Korean War increased the
demand for low density housing.48 High density urban real estate
had difficulty competing with suburban spaciousness. Third, Con-
gress encouraged suburban housing by making bank loans with
small down payments and low interest rates available for moderate
income families under section 203 of the National Housing Act.44
The Internal Revenue Code promotes home ownership by allowing
interest on mortgage loans to be deducted from gross income.45
Fourth, the development of vast highway systems facilitated de-
centralization.' 6 Improved automotive transportation led to the
growth of residential, commercial and industrial sites far removed
from the city center. Fifth, urban crime and racial conflict remain
difficult to combat. Finally, despite governmental attempts to pro-
mote economic development, many private decision makers are un-
willing to accept the burden of decay when presented with alterna-
tives for location or expansion. 7 The rate of a city's decline is, at
best, slowed by the limited influx of new business.48
Changing the location of economic growth is difficult and slow,
despite tax incentives, low interest loans, utility rate cuts or other
benefits. Private decision makers have generally resisted attempts
to entice their enterprises back into the cities.4' Individuals have
42. Starr, The Changing Life of Cities, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 49.
43. Muller, Service Costs in the Declining City, id. at 122.
44. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1709(b) (Supp. 1980).
45. 26 U.S.C.A. § 163 (Supp. 1980). Income tax deductions for mortgage interest pay-
ments reduce the real cost of buying a house by about twenty percent and encourage resi-
dential location away from the central city. See Krasoff, Managing the City of the Future,
in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 143.
46. M. GELFAND, A NATON OF Crrixs 222-30 (1975); Muller, Service Costs in the De-
clining City, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 122.
47. Starr, The Changing Life of Cities, in 1977 Comm. Print., supra note 1, at 49-50.
48. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1978, at E-6.
49. Locational incentives are a game that unindustrialized areas play as hard as devel-
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also shown little inclination to return. Failure to promote success-
fully economic development, as well as anticipated limits in federal
and state subsidies and grants, mandate that other urban manage-
ment tools be examined.
II. PLANNED SHRINKAGE: AN ALTERNATIVE
Planned shrinkage is a planning proposal for clearing busi-
nesses and individuals from targeted areas of high abandonment,
as a matter of public policy, and clustering them in more viable
areas. As an area is vacated, services would be withdrawn and the
land cleared and left undeveloped until redevelopment opportuni-
ties arose. Withdrawn services and limited public resources would
be concentrated and redirected toward more viable neighborhoods.
The essence of planned shrinkage or cut-back management
programs, as recently espoused by economists"0 and urban plan-
ners,51 is that the cost of local government must be brought in line
with cities' reduced abilities to generate operating revenues.2 Defi-
cit spending is, to an extent, a necessary attribute of big city eco-
nomics.5 When public borrowing becomes so great, however, that
cities cannot service their debt obligations, municipalities like New
York and Cleveland come perilously close to bankruptcy." Other
oped ones. Previously undeveloped jurisdictions adjust tax and service variables to bid for
desirable residents who are often firmly established in other localities. Older, established
industrial centers must counteroffer or lose an established producer of revenues and jobs.
Albin, Complexity and the Case for Large Cities, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 63.
See James & Hughes, The Process of Employment Location Change: An Empirical Analy-
sis, LAND ECONOMICS 404-13 (Nov. 1973).
50. See Thompson, Land Management Strategies for Central City Depopulation, in
1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 67.
51. Starr, The Changing Life of Cities, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 47; Prat-
ter, Strategies for City Investment, id. at 79; Sternlieb & Hughes, New Regional & Metro-
politan Realities of America, J. Am. INST. PLANNERS, July, 1977, at 241.
52. Starr, Whither Cities, NATIONS Crrms, Oct., 1977, at 20. The concept of planned
shrinkage was introduced by Roger Starr, former administrator of New York City's Housing
and Development Administration, in the New York Times. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1976, at 35.
col. 1. The idea was expanded in Starr, Making New York smaller, supra note 19, at 32.
53. See Goldberg, Gillespie, Johnson, Plunkett & Dupre, Municipal Fiscal Dilemma, 25
CAN. TAx REP. PROC. TAX CoNF.561 (1973).
54. See generally POST INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, supra note 1; 1977 Comm. Print, supra
note 1; Greenberg, Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 19. The problems of debt service and
the municipal bond market are discussed in Hertzburg, Balancing Act-New York's Fi-




cities with less serious problems may suffer from severe fiscal in-
stability. This instability jeopardizes jobs, the delivery of services,
and the cities' ability to service their debt obligation and success-
fully promote new issues of their bonds. It further accelerates the
emigration of taxpaying business firms and individuals who lack
confidence in their city's long term viability.
5
Delivery of municipal services constitutes the most expensive
and extensive component of a city's budget.5 Despite economies of
scale,5  outlays for services are more costly in high density cities
than they are in smaller, low density municipalities.58 Means must
be devised to bring the lion's share of municipal costs, city ser-
vices, more in line with revenues received. This may be accom-
plished in several ways: through a reduction in services, a reduc-
tion in their cost, or through increased efficiency in their delivery.
It is highly unlikely that services would be cut enough to re-
dress the present economic imbalance in major metropolitan areas.
As society in general becomes more affluent, it becomes increas-
ingly easy to view yesterday's luxuries as today's necessities. Once
expectations are established as to a particular level of services,
these expectations are difficult to remove. Services such as police
and fire protection are difficult to reduce for safety reasons. 59 Hos-
pital care and garbage collection affect health. Water, sewage treat-
ment, and gas and electrical services, if owned by the municipality,
are required by law to be maintained at certain levels.60 The public
and private infrastructure require a certain amount of replacement
and maintenance. Despite cutbacks, cities must still budget for oc-
55. Sternlieb & Hughes, Prologue, in POST INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, supra note 1, at 17.
56. Muller, The Declining and Growing Metropolis: A Fiscal Comparison, in POST IN-
DUSTRIAL AMERICA, supra note 1, at 197. See also K. GREENE, FISCAL INTERACTIONS IN A
METROPOLITAN AREA (1973).
57. See generally Getz, Optimum City Size: Fact or Fancy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
197 (1979).
58. Bahl, Studies on Determinants of Public Expenditures, in S. MUSHKIN & J. COT-
TON, SHARING FEDERAL FUNDS FOR STATE AND LOCAL NEEDS 184 (1969). Density and size are
not necessarily the same. New York and Los Angeles are both "large" cities but the density
of New York is greater. Muller, Service Costs in the Declining City, in 1977 Comm. Print,
supra note 1, at 120, 122-29.
59. Police protection is the least likely public service to be reduced, even in the face of
fiscal decline. Muller, Service Costs in the Declining City, id. at 128 (table 4: change in the
number of municipal employees for selected services, 1962 and 1975). See J. HALL & M.
KARTER, FIRE RATES VS. COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS (Urban Institute 1976).
60. Lineburry, Mandating Urban Equality, The Distribution of Municipal Public Ser-
vices, 53 TEx. L. REv. 26 (1974).
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casional investment above replacement and provide for gross in-
vestment to maintain certain physical assets. 1 Some infrastructure
assets can be allocated to other functions and some will be
divested. 2 Rising energy costs significantly affect the price of
services.
Not only is it difficult to limit the kind of city services availa-
ble, but it is also difficult to limit their quality. Central city re-
sidents tend to have special problems that increase the need for
social services, remedial education personnel, police, and other ser-
vices in disproportion to the overall population.6 3 A reduction in
services would, thus, be a difficult means of achieving fiscal health.
Attempts to reduce the cost of services by taking a hard stance
on wage inflation and padded payrolls have been successful in a
few cities. Despite the opposition of municipal unions, strong may-
oral leadership and community support have pulled cities like Bal-
timore and Philadelphia through strikes and legal battles over per-
sonnel cutbacks and incremental wage and benefit packages.
Inflation and fluctuations in the economy make these austerity
measures difficult to achieve and maintain. Cost may also be re-
duced by purchasing new equipment which requires less man-
power, such as one-man garbage trucks.
Another alternative is either to make city services and facili-
ties more cost efficient" or transfer them to county or state au-
thorities or to private contractors. Transfers, however, are not nec-
essarily in the best interests of the city, even though the assuming
entity can draw upon a broader base for the services' financial sup-
61. Kasoff, Managing the City of the Future, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 140.
Kasoff gives the example of Baltimore's repair of the Port Terminal. The city was faced
with the alternative of repairing or replacing the terminal at considerable municipal expense
or losing its status as a city with a port facility. Id.
62. Id. For example, a city might sell a parking structure that was operating at a loss.
Similarly, it might be possible to change a police or fire station to satellite status with a
skeleton staff to cut operating costs.
63. For an explanation of the special problems of central city residents, see Muller,
Service Costs in the Declining City, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 123; Muller, The
Declining and Growing Metropolis-A Fiscal Comparison, in POST INDUSTRIAL AMERMCA,
supra note 1, at 215-16.
64. Cleveland has had some noticeable success in revamping its Division of Waste Col-
lection and Disposal. A three year liaison between the head of that department and city
planners reorganized collection procedures, reassigned manpower, and purchased cost-sav-
ing equipment. As a result, the city saved several million dollars a year on this service. See
Krumholz, The Aging Central City: Some Modest Proposals, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra
note 1, at 101.
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port. " Divestiture of control over municipal services and facilities
may be impossible in the absence of fare or service guarantees.
City pride and politics may also interfere. Efforts could be made to
make existing workers more efficient. To the extent that the man-
power level is excessive, cuts in personnel can be made to save the
city money." Then, instead of hiring new workers, surplus person-
nel could be transferred to other jobs as they open up.67 If the level
of manpower is not the primary problem in cost containment, a
municipality may try to promote efficiency by making services eas-
ier to deliver.
At present, it is impossible for large, older cities to deliver ser-
vices efficiently because of high abandonment in certain areas.68
Even though there has been a substantial reduction in the popula-
tion of many of these cities, the result has been a mere thinning
out of overall population density. 9 It is costly to provide services
in areas of high abandonment.70 While low densities are attributa-
ble to suburbs as well as areas of high abandonment, the suburbs
are capable of assuming the burden because of their strong local
tax bases; the cities are not. In addition, the suburbs, unlike the
cities, were intentionally planned and developed for low density
living. Infrastructure, utility systems and public services are
designed to accommodate a diffuse population as efficiently as pos-
sible. The opposite situation is present in central cities. The low
65. Id. at 101; Kasoff, Managing the City of the Future, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra
note 1, at 134-35 (discussion of local government capacity buildings).
66. See Breckenfeld, How Cities Can Cope With Shrinkage, in 1977 Comm. Print,
supra note 1, at 106-07 (Pittsburgh), 108-09 (Baltimore), 111-12 (Wilmington) (note how
these cities were able to reduce manpower with few layoffs and little visible reduction in
service delivery). See also Muller, Service Costs in the Declining City, in 1977 Comm. Print,
supra note 1, at 126 (table 3: capital outlays and debt service-rapidly growing and declin-
ing cities).
There is a tendency for municipal employment to increase in excess of growth in "growth
jurisdictions" whereas a decline in population often results in municipal employment reduc-
tions at a lower rate than the city's loss of residents in "no growth jurisdictions." Id. at 126.
67. Muller, Service Costs in the Declining City, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at
126.
68. Starr, Making New York smaller, supra note 19, at 32.
69. Id. at 104-05.
70. D. SHOUP & R. MACK, ADVANCE LAND ACQUISrION BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1010
(U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development 1968); Thompson, Land Management
Strategies for Central City Depopulation, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 69. Cf.
Kravitz, The Other Neighborhoods: Building Community Institutions, id. at 92 (Kravitz
questions whether clustering actually reduces costs). See also T. MULLER, EXPANSION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SERVICES (The Urban Institute 1978).
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density, diffuse population in central cities hard hit by abandon-
ment is not intentional. Private buildings and public infrastructure
built to operate efficiently under high density pressures are costly
to maintain in relation to the benefit they provide if they are sup-
plied only for the benefit of a few remote or sporadic users.71
The essential goal behind planned shrinkage programs is to
bring the cost of government more in line with revenues. primarily
by attacking the cost of services.72 This is to be accomplished by
accelerating population loss in those slum areas of the city where
the rate of abandonment is already of epidemic proportions.7 3 Pos-
itive relocation incentives such as moving costs, rent subsidies and
employment opportunities would be used to relocate remaining in-
dividuals in suburbs or communities where they could be assimi-
lated into the work force and achieve financial independence or
where the community could absorb the cost of supporting them. 4
In lieu of relocation outside the city, efforts could be made to clus-
ter people in viable neighborhoods. 5 In conjunction with positive
relocation benefits, additional regulatory and non-regulatory tech-
niques would be used to facilitate abandonment, such as tax fore-
closure on delinquent properties, city purchase of real estate, and
withholding of discretionary neighborhood preservation funds.76
Only after the area's residents were completely relocated would
municipal services be withdrawn.7 7 The money saved from with-
drawal of services would be reallocated to those neighborhoods
71. See generally REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION, THE COSTS OF SPRAWL (1974).
72. Starr, Making New York smaller, supra note 19, at 32; Fried, City's Housing Ad-
ministrator Proposes 'Planned Shrinkage' of Some Slums, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1976, at 35,
col. 1. [Hereinafter Fried, Planned Shrinkage.]
73. Note 72 supra.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See text accompanying notes 215-86 infra.
77. A common misconception about Starr's proposal is that services are to be with-
drawn as'a means of accelerating abandonment. See Conway, Planning Without Growth, in
DESIGN & ENVIRONMENT 16 (Summer 1976); Ferebee, Urban Housing: Or No-Growth and
How Cities Can Do More With Less, in RECYCLING INNER CITY REAL ESTATE 154-55 (Prac-
ticing Law Institute, Course Handbook Series No. 127 1976). In addition, Felix Rohatyn's
proposal to treat blighted areas as "virgin industrial territory" is not in keeping with Starr's
proposal to hold land indefinitely until any one of many uses are feasible for it. Blighted
Areas' Use Is Urged by Rohatyn, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1976, at 1, col. 8. Rohatyn's proposal
to displace affirmatively the poor was severely criticized in Rohatyn Scored by Congress-
men, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1976, at 18, col. 1; City May Change Fiscal Priorities, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 21, 1976, at 27, col. 1.
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designated for conservation or redevelopment. The savings to the
city would come from more efficient provision of services to com-
pact, high density concentrations of population. Manpower costs
would be reduced. In addition, there would be a saving on re-
sources that would have been expended to provide and maintain a
duplicative public infrastructure. These resources would be reallo-
cated to create new facilities in areas targeted for conservation or
redevelopment. The high density of the area, brought about by
clustering, would justify the expenditure of city funds for services
and public infrastructure on a cost-benefit basis.78 Vacant land
would be marshalled together and held indefinitely until redevel-
opment became feasible. 9 It is this willingness to let the land lie
fallow for indefinite periods of time that so sharply distinguishes
planned shrinkage from urban renewal programs. e0
Planned shrinkage may also help neighborhood viability.81
The criteria that make a neighborhood viable are difficult to de-
fine. One consideration is sufficient density, stability and involve-
ment to attract and maintain private enterprise at the neighbor-
hood level.8 2 Private businesses tend to withdraw from an area of
high abandonment as the financial return, due to thinning of the
market for products and services, falls off.83 Positive relocation in-
centives and disincentives to remain, imposed as a matter of public
policy, force the displaced population to cluster in conservation
and redevelopment neighborhoods. This benefits the neighbor-
hoods as a whole by making it economically feasible for private
business to remain or relocate in areas where the population con-
centration is high. 4 Physical separation and demarcation of neigh-
borhoods by open tracts of land could also produce a clearer sense
78. Thompson, Land Management Strategies for Central City Depopulation, in 1977
Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 69.
79. Modern industrial and residential developments require large tracts of land. The
modern trend in housing is to construct subdivisions, not individual homes. Planned Unit
Developments, for example, require large tracts of land. Id. at 70.
80. Open spaces, however, are part of the urban renewal package in Detroit. Interview
with Professor J.E. Mogk, April 6, 1979.
81. Fried, Planned Shrinkage, supra note 72; Starr, Making New York smaller, supra
note 19, at 104-05.
82. See Stone, Planned Shrinkage: Coping With Urban Decline, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 987
(1979).
83. Id.
84. Thompson, Land Management Strategies for Central City Depopulation, in 1977
Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 69.
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of community or neighborhood identity.s5
The application of economic theories to urban growth is well
documented.8 6 This same application of theory to the urban envi-
ronment is not available, however, with respect to cities undergo-
ing substantial population loss.87 No data is available to determine
precisely the size of an area which must be shrunk to result in a
saving to the municipality. One theory suggests that economies of
scale, savings due to a city's size, do not go on forever. 8 At some
point the limits of efficient municipal operation are reached.89
Once a city becomes too sprawling or complex, and the coordinat-
ing powers of city government are stretched, diseconomies of scale
operate to increase the cost of services and infrastructure per unit
of population. At this point costs are driven up and services are
delivered less efficiently.
Because planned shrinkage deals with neighborhoods, econo-
mies of scale must be assessed at the neighborhood level rather
than for the city as a whole, since it is this unevenness in popula-
tion density that in part makes the delivery of services to certain
neighborhoods economically questionable. The infrastructure and
service areas of central cities were originally planned to provide
maximum benefit at minimum cost.90 A city built "big" operates
most efficiently at the high density its services and infrastructure
were designed to meet. Therefore, the city's fixed costs, such as
police, fire protection, debt service, and infrastructure, can be
spread over a broader population base, reducing the cost per unit
of population."1
If the population exceeds this optimal level, the city may be-
come so large that there is a diminishing marginal return on the
municipality's investment in services and infrastructure.9 2 Disecon-
85. Id.
86. See R. HEILBRONER, THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM (1968); READINGS IN URBAN ECONOM-
ICS AND SPATIAL PATTERNS (M. Greenberg, ed. 1974) [hereinafter URBAN ECONOMICS]; Getz,
Optimum City Size: Fact or Fancy, 43 LAW & CoNTrmP. PROB. 197 (1979).
87. Interview with Wilbur Thompson, April 16, 1979 at Wayne State University.
88. R. HEILBRONER, supra note 86, at 541-42.
89. Ullman, The Nature of Cities Reconsidered, in URBAN ECONOMICS, supra note 86, at
195.
90. Muller, Service Costs in the Declining City, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at
119.
91. This is true even though central city fixed costs are higher than they are in neigh-
boring localities. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
92. R. HEILBRONER, supra note 86, at 542.
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omies of scale also result when a system is designed for one level of
use but is actually used at much lower levels. At sub-optimal levels
of use, brought about by high vacancy rates and abandonment,
even though the fixed costs are spread over the entire municipal
population, it costs more money per unit of population to service
low density, central city neighborhoods.
By decreasing overall population while maintaining optimal
density via clustering, a municipality may take advantage of the
savings produced by economies of scale. 3 While research has not
yet been marshalled to establish the precise shape of savings under
a program of planned shrinkage, the theory of economies of scale
coupled with common sense indicates that municipal costs may be
diminished by maintaining population at optimal levels in conser-
vation and redevelopment areas, even in the face of overall munici-
pal population decline. In short, while a well documented case of
substantial savings is not possible, given the present state of the
art, both intuitively and in theory, the contraction of cities makes
good economic sense.
9 4
The concept of planned shrinkage outlined above has been at-
tacked as a simple-minded skirting of the real issues in urban man-
agement today; curbing the tide of urban divestment," acquies-
cence in the decline of city resources and job opportunities at the
expense of the urban poor," and the inability of municipalities to
provide the services required by their inhabitants while keeping
within their budgets.9 7 Nevertheless, congressional rumblings are
good indicators that major urban areas cannot rely on municipal
welfare payments to redress their fiscal woes.98 Economic develop-
ment programs have neither reversed outward migration nor, for
the most part, made an appreciable dent in improving central city
93. "On the demand side ... the first problem is to be sure that there is always an
adequate total demand to induce high level utilization of productive capacity." G. BACH,
ECONoMics: AN INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS AND POLICY 580 (8th ed. 1974).
94. Interview with Wilbur Thompson, supra note 87. Shrinkage would certainly work if
we could empty a one mile square grade school district. An interim problem is the extent of
the service areas for such activities as police and fire. This is because the longer the re-
sponse time the less reason there is for going to the scene of the problem. Id.
95. Kravitz, The Other Neighborhoods-Building Community Institutions, in 1977
Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 91. See generally Stone, supra note 82.
96. Starr, Making New York smaller, supra note 19.
97. See generally Stone, supra note 82.
98. See note 33 supra. See generally Krumholz, The Aging Central City: Some Modest
Proposals, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 99.
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employment opportunities. If quality of life is to be maintained in
central cities, politicians and planners must be willing to rethink
ingrained attitudes regarding growth, personal freedoms, and prop-
erty rights. If planed shrinkage can bring about smaller, but
healthy urban centers, then society may discover that less is in-
deed more.
III. How TO IMPLEMENT A PROGRAM OF CLUSTERING AND
CLEARING
A. Designating Areas for Clustering and Clearing
The success of a program of planned shrinkage is dependent
upon the city's ability to cluster the population in certain areas
and clear it in others. The first step a planning commission must
take in implementing planned shrinkage is to divide the entire city
into zones and classify neighborhoods according to viability. A
threshold issue would be ascertaining the factors to be considered
in making a viability determination. " Clustering would take place
in areas designated for conservation or redevelopment. Clearing
would be the goal in depletion zones.
Conservation zones, where clustering would occur, should be
those areas where private involvement in business and housing is
strong. In addition to strong private investment, other factors
which indicate viability include extensive public investment in
capital structure, insurance and banking commitments, relatively
new and well maintained buildings, proximity to adequate and
cost-efficient services and facilities and strong local leadership. 100
Since these areas manifest physical and social strengths they
would be the critical focal points from which maintenance and re-
vitalization efforts would flow. 101
A high incidence of abandonment would be the single most
important factor in mapping out depletion zones, those areas
scheduled to be cleared under a program of planned shrinkage.10 2
The disruptive effects of planned shrinkage could be minimized by
targeting those areas already hard hit by abandonment for clear-
99. See generally Pratter, Strategies for City Investment, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra
note 1, at 80-81 (area types enumerated).
100. Id. at 81.
101. Id. at 81-82.
102. Id. at 84-87.
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ing. A high abandonment and vacancy rate indicates weak private
investment and shows a lack of commitment to the area.103 Old
and decrepit housing, absence of a neighborhood commercial dis-
trict, inefficient or spotty public services and facilities, redlining,
facilities vulnerable to deleterious neighborhood influences (such
as vandalism) and municipal services with an inflexible service area
may constitute factors which militate against saving a neighbor-
hood. 04 Classifying depletion zones is almost certain to raise sub-
stantial political issues.
More difficult questions are posed when the boundaries of re-
development areas are to be drawn. These marginal areas reflect
neither the obvious redeeming qualities of viable areas slated for
conservation nor the high abandonment typical of depletion
zones. 1°5 In addition to the criteria considered for conservation and
depletion areas, three additional factors are applicable to these
"swing" neighborhoods. First, if a marginal area contains expensive
capital improvements, such as a large public housing project, the
threat of neighborhood deterioration may lead city planners to sal-
vage the public's investment by designating the area for redevelop-
ment rather than depletion. Necessary funds could then be
pumped into the neighborhood to turn the tide of abandonment. 100
Less significant infrastructure is more easily sacrificed.10 7 The sec-
ond factor is the suitability of the area for eventual recycling. 08
Proximity to water or transportation systems may suggest indus-
trial or commercial use. 09 A third consideration is whether desig-
nation as a depletion or conservation area would complement sur-
rounding land use patterns or whether such designation would
create an island of use inconsistent with the surrounding area."10
Neighborhoods adjacent to depletion areas would be poor choices
for redevelopment since the existence of a large tract of cleared
land tends to promote further abandonment in the surrounding
fringe. This would allow even larger parcels to be assembled for
103. Id. at 84.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 82-84.








B. Clustering: Promotion of Movement from Depletion Areas to
Those Designated for Conservation and Redevelopment
Depending upon the time framework in which city planners
hope to effectuate clustering and clearing, an active or passive plan
of shrinkage may be pursued. An active plan of shrinkage would
compel the removal of people out of depletion zones. The passive
approach would utilize non-coercive incentives to promote reloca-
tion in conservation or redevelopment areas. Disincentives for re-
maining in depletion areas would be employed in conjunction with
relocation benefits.
1. Recommendation: Passive shrinkage as a means to pro-
mote clustering. Clustering may be achieved directly or indirectly
by using a passive, non-coercive approach to shrinkage. Offering
positive relocation benefits or employment opportunities is a direct
means of achieving clustering.1 1 2 By offering depletion area re-
sidents better housing and other neighborhood amenities the bene-
fits of relocation could be sweetened.
It is recommended, however, that clustering be achieved indi-
rectly through the allocation of scarce municipal, state and federal
resources. 3 Neighborhood decline is an exponential phenome-
non.1 1 4 Once substantial depopulation occurs, with no compensat-
ing inflow of new business or residents, it is likely that the down-
ward trend will continue absent a substantial infusion of public
funds.1 5 By granting discretionary neighborhood preservation
funds1 6 to conservation and renovation areas, those locations are
made comparatively more desirable to business and individuals.
Attractions such as good schools, recreational opportunities, mod-
ern public facilities, and a strong private business community may
be used as an inducement to relocate in favored areas. Neighbor-
111. Id.
112. Pratter, Strategies for City Investment, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 86.
113. Stone, supra note 82. A substantial amount of money must be available to demol-
ish abandoned buildings in-clearing areas. However, at present over 80% of the Community
Block Grant funds are being used for the demolition of existing structures.
114. See generally G. STERNLIEB & R. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: THE TEN-
EMENT LANDLORD REVIdITED (1973).
115. Stone, supra note 82.




hoods where abandonment is pandemic and where discretionary
neighborhood preservation funds are withheld may be expected to
decline further as the comparative benefits of living in these neigh-
borhoods diminish. Clustering may further be promoted indirectly
by assuring that Federal Housing Administration subsidies and
mortgage insurance is available in cluster areas. 117 Federal pro-
grams could be augmented by state and municipal programs.118
Clustering will also be a by-product of clearing techniques. A bene-
fit of these approaches is that no additional bureaucracy, over and
above the city's own planning department, need be established to
implement the program.119
2. Limitations on passive shrinkage as a tool to promote
municipal fiscal integrity and neighborhood viability. To the ex-
tent that passive shrinkage is accelerated through the use of relo-
cation benefits, the cost to the state or city of providing these ben-
efits would be the most limiting factor in the use of this clustering
technique.120 Expenses incurred in demolishing old buildings would
also add to the total cost. Federal relocation assistance, however, is
not triggered until federal funds are used to acquire and clear
land. 21 At the onset, private enterprise will need coaxing to reen-
117. To an extent, red-lining exists on the federal level and is not confined to private
lending institutions. See regulations issued under 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715(b)-24 C.F.R. § 203.
118. While it is hoped that these programs could be coordinated, it is possible that
consistency in policy is impossible on the federal level.
119. Stone, supra note 82, at 998.
120. Note, Relocation-The Uniform Relocation Assistance Policies Act of 1970-An
Empirical Study, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1329 (1975). Basic benefits may be expected to include
moving expenses, replacement housing for tenants and homeowners and relocation assis-
tance advisory services. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4622-4625 (Supp. 1980).
121. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4601-4655 (Supp. 1980). Federal relocation assistance is not available, how-
ever, when a municipal urban development corporation acquires land without using federal
funds for real property acquisitions, even though federal funds are ultimately used in the
redevelopment of the area. Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979). Neither are fed-
eral benefits available for relbcations caused by a private developer or agency when federal
funds are not received. See Moorer v. HUD, 561 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 919 (1978) or when federal aid comes in any form other than that specified by the Act.
Conway v. Harris, 586 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1978) (federal rent subisidies do not constitute
federal aid within the meaning of the Act). See generally Uniform Relocation Assistance
and Land Acquisitions Policies-1970: Hearings on H.R. 14898, H.R. 14899, S.L, and Re-
lated Bills Before the House Committee on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1969-
70); ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV'T RELATIONS, RELOCATION: UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF PEO-
PLE AND BUSINESSES DISPLACED By GOVERNMENTS (1965); Note, The Uniform Relocation Act:




ter redevelopment areas, necessitating a package of tax, employ-
ment and low interest loan incentives.
122
Many low income families live in areas where abandonment is
high and housing deteriorated because they cannot afford to live
elsewhere. Designation of clearing areas will increase the demand
for housing in cluster zones, driving up its cost and making it effec-
tively out of the reach of many low income families. The market
mechanism must not be allowed to exacerbate the plight of low
income families or foreclose their ability to find adequate housing.
Critical to the political success of planned shrinkage is the ability
of government or a private developer to supply relocation benefits
and subsidize adequate housing for displaced low income residents.
Otherwise, the costs of clearing will be shouldered by those dis-
placed residents who are least able to afford it.
Provision of these benefits may also be time-consuming.
Bringing redevelopment, neighborhoods up to par requires the con-
struction and rehabilitation of suitable housing and the provision
of adequate public services and facilities.12 Just as relocation is
,not expected to take place all at once under a passive approach,
neither may total redevelopment be expected instantaneously. The
credibility of a clustering policy will depend, to some extent, on
the government's carrying out its commitment to conserve and
rehabilitate.
Cost limitations on planned shrinkage are second only to the
serious political problems that may be expected to attend reloca-
tion. The plan has been decried as inhumane and as an assault on
certain racial and economic groups.124 The poor and minorities are
the target of relocation since these groups tend to live in depletion
areas where decay and abandonment are the most rampant.125 The
residents of these neighborhoods have many serious social
problems. A high crime rate, indigency, substandard educational
122. Anderson, Angling for Capital: States Redouble Effort to Lure New Industry and
Provide More Jobs, Wall St. J., July 11, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
123. Stone, supra note 82; Thompson, Land Management Strategies for Central City
Depopulation, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 73.
124. Starr, Making New York smaller, supra note 19, at 32; Pratter, Strategies for City
Investment, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 87-88.
125. Sternlieb & Hughes, New Regional and Metropolitan Realities of America, in
1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 25 (exhibit 14: population by race and type of residence




backgrounds, large families, monolingualism in a language other
than English, and health problems are disproportionately present
in these neighborhoods. 12 6 Passive relocation may simply transfer
the aggregation of these problems from depletion areas to cluster
zones, causing new social problems in the relocatees' new neighbor-
hoods or otherwise creating a negative impact.
3. Affirmative shrinkage as an alternative. The affirmative
approach to planned shrinkage through forced relocation to cluster
zones within the city or other areas of the state or country is a less
desirable alternative. Serious constitutional problems are encoun-
tered with programs that compel people to leave their homes when
they do not wish to go.127 Mandatory relocation constitutes suffi-
cient state action to trigger constitutional protection of individual
freedoms and property rights.128 The right to travel,129 equal pro-
tection, 130 and substantive due process 3' are arguments raised to
counter relocation attempts. All of these challenges invert the pre-
sumption of constitutionality by demanding that the state justify
its action as necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.1 3 2
A problem encountered by urban renewal programs, which
could carry over to planned shrinkage, was that city officials and
housing authorities failed to provide adequate relocation opportu-
126. K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, NEGROS IN CITIES (1965); N. GLAZER & D. MOYNIHAN,
BEYOND THE MELTING POT (1963); J. JACOBS, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF GREAT AMERICAN CIT-
is (1961); America, Economic Development in Afro-America, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra
note 1, at 181.
127. Comment, The Right to Travel and Its Application to Restrictive Housing Laws,
66 Nw. U.L. REv. 635 (1971); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Pro-
tection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969); Harvith, The Constitutionality of
Residence Tests for General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 567
(1966).
128. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
129. The right to travel is not specifically enumerated in the federal Constitution al-
though it was expressly listed among those rights to be protected in the Articles of Confed-
eration. U.S. Art. Confederation, art. IV. The right is now construed to emanate from vari-
ous constitutional provisions including the privileges and immunities provision of article IV
and the fourteenth amendment, the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, the commerce clause, the ninth amendment and as being implicit in the Constitution
taken as a whole.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Cf. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) (the un-
lawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in an
unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike is a denial of equal protec-
tion if an element of purposeful or intentional discrimination is shown).
131. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
132. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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nities for low income families. While people were forced to move
out of their old neighborhoods, the relocation of low income hous-
ing outside the city coupled with the discriminatory character of
the private housing market in the city forced low income residents
to move out of central city areas. The court in Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Redevelopment Agency1 33 held, on equal protection
grounds, that the Urban Renewal Act required that alternative
housing be provided in a same or similar neighborhood and that
units be made available in relation to the numbers of those dis-
placed. To shirk the responsibility of providing non-discriminatory
alternative housing for low income families, the court found, would
be a violation of the fourteenth amendment and in derogation of
the then effective urban renewal legislation.134 Norwalk had a sub-
stantial impact on urban renewal and slum clearance projects. The
same problems are present with an affirmative approach to
planned shrinkage and, as such, make this approach undesirable.
C. Clearing
A variety of legal tools are available to expedite clearing, the
acceleration of population loss from areas with high abandonment
rates. The goals of clearing are twofold. First, clearing promotes
movement away from depletion areas so that services may be with-
drawn and redundant infrastructure abandoned at a saving to the
city. Second, clearing enables large tracts of land to be assembled
for future constructive use. It is important to select a legal tool to
accomplish clearing that will not merely result in the vacation of
land, but will enable the acquiring entity to hold and develop this
vacant land in accordance with well defined, long range goals.
1. Recommendation: Land banking to acquire and hold de-
pletion zone property. It is recommended that clearing be accom-
plished by land banks, 13 public entities given the resources and.
133. 393 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
134. Id. at 924.
135. See generally Public Land Banking, supra note 9; Kraus, Land Banking: New
Solutions for Old Problems, 39 ALB. L. REV. 771 (1975) [hereinafter Land Banking: New
Solutions]; Note, Land Banking: Development Control Through Public Acquisition and
Marketing, 6 ENVIRON. L. 191 (1975) [hereinafter Land Banking: Development Control];
FITCH & R. MACK, LAND BANKING IN THE GOOD EARTH OF AMERICA 134 (1974); D. SHOUP &
R. MACK, supra note 70. Land banks were specifically Yecommended by the Commission on
Urban Problems for planning orderly growth, development and re-development of urban
areas. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 251-52
1981] 287
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
power by state enabling legislation to acquire land in depletion
zones, amass it and hold it in reserve indefinitely. Land banks
would acquire land in areas of high abandonment by foreclosure on
tax liens, outright purchase of the fee, and condemnation. Mere
acquisition of land by a public body is insufficient to accomplish
the dual goals of clearing. The land must be held until the time is
ripe for redevelopment. This means that the land bank will not be
self-sustaining financially, especially in its early years of operation,
since it will not be able to accomplish its overall objectives if it is
required to sell previously acquired land to perpetuate its opera-
tions. For this reason the bank must be sufficiently funded to cover
acquisition costs, demolition of existing structures and any carry-
ing charges that might be incurred in the period between acquisi-
tion and redevelopment.
a. Objectives of land banks in a program of planned
shrinkage. Land banks in Europe138 and the United States 31 have
primarily been used to cope with the problems of urban growth.3 8
They are similarly well suited to accomplish the shrinkage and
eventual redevelopment of central cities.139 The primary advantage
of land banks is that governmental ownership of land facilitates
implementation of long range socio-economic policies as a by-prod-
uct of comprehensive land use plans. In central city areas where a
program of planned shrinkage is in effect, the primary objective of
(1969); ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 6-102-103 (Proposed Official Draft, 1976).
136. See Public Land Banking, supra note 9, at 908; Land Banking: Development Con-
trol, supra note 135, at 195; Roberts, Land Storage-The Swedish Example, 38 MOD. L.
REV. 121 (1975); Lefcoe, The Right to Develop Land: The German and Dutch Experience,
56 ORE. L. REV. 31 (1977).
137. Richmond, Virginia presently has a limited program of advance land acquisition.
See D. SHOUP & R. MACK, supra note 70. Limited land acquisition for narrowly defined
purposes is carried on by one-third of all United States cities of over 50,000 in population.
Id. at 4. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania has an industrial land reserve program carried out by
the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC). PHILADELPHIA INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PIDC's BIG YEAR IN NEW PLANT CONSTRUCTION (1968). See also
Public Land Banking, supra note 9, at 915.
Puerto Rico's Bureau of Land Administration carries out extensive land banking pursu-
ant to P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23.311(f) (s) (1980). See also (Ohio) OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
349.02-349.16 (Page Supp. 1980); (Illinois) ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67-1/2, §§ 303-330 (1980);
(North Carolina) N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A, 135-143 (1980).
138. See H. FLECHNER,'LAND BANKING IN THE CONTROL OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT (1974).
Industrial development, housing and urban renewal and advance land acquisition for public
facilities are typical uses of land banking. Id. at 61-63, 65, 66, 195-96.
139. Land Banking: New Solutions, supra note 135.
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a land bank would be to clear land in depletion zones so that ser-
vices may be withdrawn and the population forced to cluster else-
where. Even if the possibility of recycling the banked land is re-
mote, the savings to the city from clearing and the benefits to the
community from clustering justify the operation of the land bank.
Outright ownership gives the government absolute control over the
future use of land.140 In comparison, "[a] landowner may resist the
pressure of taxation or the lure of subsidy; the city fathers may
grant too many exceptions to the zoning ordinance or master plan;
the budget may not allow for enough inspectors to enforce the
building and sanitary codes; all attempts at enforcement are sub-
ject to litigation and delay. 14 1 All of the prerogatives associated
with private ownership of land could frustrate attempts to clear an
area and control its future use.
An ancillary objective of land banking in a program of planned
shrinkage would be the promotion of orderly and economically
sound urban redevelopment. 142 One of the many reasons why in-
dustry has sought suburban locations is the scarcity of urban land
and the prohibitive cost of purchasing and preparing available land
for industrial use. 43 In addition to its primary goals of shrinking
services and clustering central city populations, land banking
would create industrial, commercial, and residential land reserves
of sufficient size to accommodate even the most sprawling uses of
land.144 If a use is eventually suggested that would contribute to
the economy or quality of life in the central city, the banked land
could be reparceled, supplied with appropriate utilities and sold or
leased complete with a package of tax, employment, and other in-
centives all in place. By controlling the nature and direction of
subsequent redevelopment, city planners could promote orderly
regrowth and avoid past land use mistakes by dispersing the land
in accordance with a comprehensive plan for the area, complete
with controls and restrictions limiting its use. 4 5 Social and eco-
nomic objectives could be furthered by dispersing land to labor in-
140. U.S. NAT'L RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, PUBLIC LAND AcQuIsITION PART II: URBAN
LANDS 11 (1941).
141. Id.
142. See generally Public Land Banking, supra note 9, at 915.
143. Id.
144. See text accompanying notes 79 & 80 supra.
145. See generally Brownfield, The Disposition Problem in Urban Renewal, 25 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 732 (1960).
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tensive industries, for example, which would draw on neighboring
clusters housing unskilled and unemployed workers. As much as
economic redevelopment is desirable, delay is necessary when it is
not yet possible to develop the land to its fullest potential.146 Pre-
mature redevelopment or spotty resettlement by business firms
and individuals who are incapable of shouldering the service and
infrastructure costs associated with reopening the area would only
repeat the mistakes of the past.
147
b. Mechanics of land banking in a program of planned
shrinkage. The choice of an appropriate entity to establish and op-
erate the land bank is important for political, legal and economic
reasons. It is recommended that a public benefit corporation be
established to bank the land in depletion areas. 14  There are sev-
eral limitations imposed on municipal corporations or state agen-
cies that make these entities undesirable as land banks. Since
planned shrinkage is largely a response to municipal fiscal crises, it
is unlikely that cities would have the financial resources to buy and
hold land indefinitely as is required by a program of clustering and
clearing. In addition to cost considerations, a municipality is lim-
ited by state constitutions in the amount and type of bonds it may
issue. 149 Consequently, bonds would be of little value to augment
municipal resources for intensive land banking. Revenue bonds
would be impractical because the land bank would not necessarily
engage in immediate resale operations. Another important limita-
146. Public Land Banking, supra note 9, at 933.
147. A major problem in urban renewal efforts in the 1960's was that the time limita-
tions of five to eight years for redevelopment resulted in "wasteful, extravagant, hurried,
and piecemeal development inadequate for the city's future." Brownfield, supra note 145, at
760.
148. Public corporations are legislatively created. They are defined as "corporate bodies
authorized by legislative action to function outside of the regulai structure of state or local
government in order to finance, construct and usually to operate revenue-producing enter-
prises." Shestack, The Public Authority, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 553 (1957). Alternatively, an
authority or commission having municipal powers could acquire land in depletion zones
and hold it for eventual private redevelopment. See Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 99.010-99.715 (1980)
(Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority Law). Another possibility is that a private
redevelopment corporation be given the powers of purchase and eminent domain. Eventual
redevelopment plans of the private corporation would be subject to approval and supervi-
sion by an administrative or legislative agency. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 353.010-353.180
(1980) (Urban Redevelopment Corporations Law).
149. Public Land Banking, supra note 9, at 940. See generally Dawson, Patterns of
Obligation Bonds, in State and Local Public Facility Needs and Financing, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 148, 153-55 (1966).
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tion is the vulnerability of municipalities to local political pres-
sures. 150 Land banking may be expected to be rife with conflicting
views on what should be done and when. Political pressure to rede-
velop land prematurely and return it to the tax rolls could result in
a perpetuation of the problems planned shrinkage was designed to
prevent. State agencies are similarly ill suited. 151 Reliance on
yearly legislative appropriations would be an unpredictable way of
funding such an important urban project. Management by guber-
natorial appointees would also be inimical to the need for consis-
tent long range planning.
Public benefit corporations offer several advantages over state
or locally run land banks. These corporations are separate entities
from the state.15 2 They may sue or be sued in their own name.
15 3
They generally enjoy freedom from constitutionally imposed debt
limitations, tax free status, exemption on interest from their
bonds, freedom from local political control, and independence in
administrative and management matters.' Autonomy is their
most striking virtue 55 since the success of clearing will be largely
dependent upon decision makers resisting redevelopment before
the optimum time and making public rather than private
decisions.
15 6
Public benefit corporations must be legislatively infused with
sufficient legal powers to buy and condemn land through the exer-
cise of eminent domain.157 Land banks must also be funded at a
level that will allow them to keep land out of productive use indefi-
nitely. Funding a land bank to promote planned shrinkage may re-
quire a higher funding level than funding a land banking program
to promote orderly growth.158 Since the object of land banking in
150. Public Land Banking, supra note 9, at 940.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 943; Shestack, supra note 148, at 555.
153. Shestack, supra note 148, at 555.
154. Public Land Banking, supra note 9, at 943-44. I.R.C. § 103.
155. MSHDA and MSHEA, however, are political organizations which are not totally
autonomous.
156. S. Scorr & J. BOLLENS, GOVERNING A METROPOLITAN REGION (1968).
157. Whether payment may be subsequent to the taking is discussed in Marquis, Con-
stitutional and Statutory Authority to Condemn, 43 IowA L. REV. 170 (1958). Infusing pub-
lic benefit corporations with the power of eminent domain does not convert them into a
government agency or instrumentality. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976);
Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 120-21, 59 N.E.2d 18, 22 (1945).
158. D. SHOUP & R. MACK, supra note 70, at 48-50. This is because the resale of land is
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planned shrinkage is clearing of depletion areas rather than imme-
diate redevelopment, debt financing through negotiable bonds and
notes is not practical."5 9 A land bank organized to clear depletion
areas and implement shrinkage would operate at a loss since it
would incur capital expenses without the benefit of compensating
resales or leases, at least in the immediate future. Debts secured by
a blanket mortgage on the bank's entire holdings would similarly
be impractical. 60
Whereas private investors could not realistically be expected
to find a land bank's security for bonds very attractive, the federal
government, as a matter of public policy, could be expected to
fund the bank's acquisition of depletion area land with repayment
of the monies to take place in the future. This would be necessary
because the impoverished budgets of large, older cities make mu-
nicipal funding unrealistic. Even with state funding of land bank-
ing, like the New York State Urban Development Corporation,"'
the Puerto Rico Land Administration, 62 and the Michigan State
Housing Development Authority,"6 3 resources of the magnitude re-
quired are unlikely absent federal contributions. Existing legisla-
tive projects and proposals suggest that the federal government is
receptive to the concept of public land banking."," Funds are pres-
ently authorized for this purpose by the Community Development
only an ancillary goal. Costs are not recouped. The costs of land assembly and management
constitute a large share of a growth oriented land bank's cost.
159. Public Land Banking, supra note 9, at 964. It is highly unlikely that a bond issue
would be successful because of the entity's innovative goals, techniques, and dubious
financial future, in spite of its eligibility to receive federal guarantees on its bonds and
notes, as well as interest payments on its indebtedness. Id.
160. Id.
161. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 6251-6285 (McKinney Supp. 1980). For a discussion of
New York's UDC, see Amdursky, A Public-Private Partnership for Urban Progress, 46 J.
URB. LAW 199 (1969).
162. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, § 311(f)(s) (1980) (Puerto Rican Land Administration Act
of May 16, 1962, No. 13).
163. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.1401-125.146 (1980).
164. See note 161 supra. Support for advance land acquisition programs has come from
other influential sources. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (1968); Haar, Wanted: Two
Federal Levers for Urban Land Use-Land Banks and Urbank: Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Housing, Panels of the House Committee on Banking & Currency, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 932 (1971). NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R.
Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON URBAN HOUSINO,
A DECENT HOME (1969). ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN
AND RURAL AMERICA: POLICIES FOR FUTURE GROWTH (1968).
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Block Grant program1 5 and under Title I of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974.18s It is likely, however, that
the vast sums of money necessary for such a land bank would re-
quire new legislation with federal funding provisions akin to those
provided under the old urban renewal programs. As a general rule,
the federal government paid for two-thirds of the net project cost
of those programs with local government absorbing the remain-
der. 167 While monetary bailouts by the federal and state govern-
ments to cure budget deficits are unlikely, except in emergency sit-
uations,168 the posture of government for dealing with a long term
solution to the problem of municipal fiscal integrity by planned
shrinkage may reasonably result in the commitment of substantial
federal and state funds. This is because the emphasis on planned
shrinkage is economic viability and self sufficiency on a smaller
scale, rather than municipal welfare on a larger one. 6 9 The antici-
pated result would justify the initial expenditure.
Lack of funds is not the only problem. A public benefit corpo-
ration is generally immune from local property taxation. 70
Purchase of productive land by the land bank takes this land off
the tax rolls and results in a further loss of revenues by money-
hungry cities. There are several possible answers to this quandary.
One is that enabling legislation waive this exemption and in fund-
ing the land bank, consider these charges part of its operating
costs. Another answer is acquiescence; the tax contribution of land
in depletion areas before they were classified as such is so minimal
that removal of these blocks from the tax rolls entirely will make
little difference in the city's net revenues.171 Tax assessments in
depletion areas would be low to begin with due to low property
values and the poor condition of private capital. Loss assessments
165. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5303 (Supp. 1981).
166. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5301-5317 (Supp. 1981).
167. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1453(a)(2).
168. THE PRESIDENT'S URBAN AND REGIONAL POLICY GROUP, U.S. DEP'T OF HouSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, A NEW PARTNERSHIP TO CONSERVE AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES 1-10-15,
I-22-28 (1978).
See Howell, The Evolving National Urban Policy: The Role of the Private Sec-
tor-Moneychangers of the Northeast, 11 URB. LAw. 270-71 (1979).
169. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5301(c)(8) (Supp. 1981).
170. See generally Land Banking: New Solutions, supra note 135, at 779-81. Act of
July 15, 1949, ch. 338, § 305(b), 63 Stat. 428 (repealed).
171. Tax loss is determined by the assessed value of the property and property tax
rates. D. SHOUP & R. MACK, supra note 70, at 50-51.
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coupled with delinquency means that the tax contribution of de-
pletion areas is insubstantial when compared to that of viable
neighborhoods. A third possibility is that owners of healthy private
businesses could be expected to pay slightly higher property taxes
since they reap the benefits of clustering. This could be accom-
plished merely by raising the tax rates. As assessments go down
due to area-wide abandonment, so should they go up in neighbor-
hoods where density is high and land is productively used. Cluster-
ing in redevelopment areas essentially consolidates the business
and residential population of two marginal areas into one viable
area. Instead of a thirty percent occupancy rate, landlords enjoy
more tenants. Instead of folding, the neighborhood store is able to
survive once the demand for services and products is increased. In
exchange for the sacrifice of depletion zones and the concommitant
loss of tax revenues, cluster area residents should pay for their via-
bility. A final approach to loss of municipal funds is to solicit in-
demnification from the federal government to the extent of actual
revenue loss. The money could eventually be repaid out of pro-
ceeds from the sale or lease of cleared property. This solution was
used in urban renewal areas.172 Congress could once again author-
ize this activity.
Three acquisition tools are available to help land banks assem-
ble land in depletion zones: tax foreclosure, purchase, and condem-
nation. City foreclosure on liens created by tax delinquencies could
be an inexpensive and non-disruptive means of acquiring property
in depletion areas.
Tax delinquency is prevalent in central city areas where the
incidence of abandonment is high. 17 Low property values due to
abandonment in the surrounding neighborhood, coupled with
property tax and maintenance costs that exceed the owner/land-
lord's ability to yield a return, work to produce owner disinterest
and tax delinquency.' 7 The higher the incidence of abandonment,
172. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1460(e)(Supp. 1980) (federal indemnification to city for land re-
moved from tax rolls).
173. See Pratter, Strategies for City Investment, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at
79.
174. G. STERNLmB & R. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT 319 (1973); Sternlieb &
Burchell, Residential Property Tax Delinquency: A Forerunner of Residential Abandon-
ment, 1 REAL ESTATE L.J. 256 (1973). See S. OLSON & M. LACHMAN, TAx DELINQUENCY IN
THE INNER CITY (1976). Nachbaur, Empty Houses: Abandoned Residential Buildings in the
Inner City, 17 How. L.J. 3 (1971).
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the more likely an area will be targeted for clearing. Foreclosure on
tax liens and land banking tax delinquent property would be a log-
ical starting place for clearing areas hard hit by outward migration.
The cost of public acquisition of tax delinquent land would be less
than the cost of either purchase or condemnation.
The least expensive means of obtaining public ownership of
tax delinquent properties is that adopted by Missouri and Ohio.
These jurisdictions have attempted to solve part of the problem of
central city abandonment and tax delinquency by streamlining the
proceedings for foreclosure of tax liens and land banking tax delin-
quent lands which remain unsold after foreclosure sales for future
development. 17 5 Missouri's Land Reutilization Law76 enables the
city of St. Louis to foreclose on tax delinquent property within two
years using in rem proceedings. A public Land Reutilization Au-
thority has been established to hold, manage, sell, or lease fore-
closed property for which a minimum bid is not received at a fore-
closure sale.177 Once a parcel has been certified as delinquent, the
auditor sets a minimum bid which is determined by the full
amount of taxes owing, penalties, attorney(s) fees and administra-
tive costs. This constitutes the minimum amount for which the
parcel may be sold at a foreclosure sale. In St. Louis if a minimum
bid is not received at the time the parcel is first offered for sale,
the Land Reutilization Authority bids the minimum amount and
takes title regardless of whether the property is vacant or occupied.
Under Ohio Law,178 an electing municipal corporation with a
Land Reutilization Program automatically makes a minimum bid
on non-productive lands only after the land has been offered twice
at foreclosure sales without receiving a minimum bid from a pri-
vate party.179 If a municipality has no Land Reutilization Program
or the land is productive, the parcel is forfeited to the state after
the second unsuccessful sale. If state-held productive lands become
175. See generally Note, Land Banking Tax Delinquent Property: Reform and Revi-
talization, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 517 (1978).
176. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 92.700-92.920 (Vernon Supp. 1980). See generally Langsdorf,
Urban Decay, Property Tax Delinquency: A Solution in St. Louis, 5 URB. LAW. 729 (1973);
Pratter, Strategies for City Investment, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 86.
177. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 92.700 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
178. Onxo Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 5721.181, 5721.191, 5722.01-5722.14 (Page Supp. 1980).
The express purposes of the Ohio law are to restore tax delinquent property to the tax rolls
and to help rejuvenate and redevelop abandoned areas of cities. Id. § 5722.02.
179. Id. § 5722.03.
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unproductive, an electing municipality may acquire them by mak-
ing the minimum bid. 18° An automatic minimum bid system limits
the land bank's acquisition costs to assessments, penalties and
charges due on the parcel. 81 The primary drawback to such a sys-
tem of land acquisition to achieve clearing is that only tax delin-
quent parcels may be acquired and then only those for which no
minimum bid was made by a private purchaser. To enable the land
bank to acquire all necessary tax delinquent property in an area
targeted for clearing, the sales price of the property should be set
by appraisers and only the municipality or state given the opportu-
nity to bid this amount at the time of the foreclosure sale. Since
the cost of acquiring tax delinquent parcels in this manner is little
different from outright purchase, it should be resorted to only
when necessary to effectuate clearing in a particular area. Alterna-
tively, if a private bid exceeded the amount of the minimum bid,
the municipality could be given a preemptory right to acquire cer-
tain property at the price set by the private bidder.
Acquisition of tax delinquent properties would give the land
bank free title to the property with the exception of recorded ease-
ments and covenants. If the land bank is organized in the form of a
municipal corporation, non-profit corporation or other public en-
tity, the property could be exempt from taxation. 82 The loss to the
city from property tax revenues would be minimal since the land
was tax delinquent to begin with.
A final benefit of land banking tax delinquent parcels in clear-
ing zones is that acquisition of such parcels returns to the public
some of the investment it has made. City residents and municipal
governments pay in terms of lost revenues, expenditures for demo-
lition, and administrative costs incurred in foreclosure
proceedings. 83
A second acquisition technique is outright purchase of deple-
tion zone land by the land bank without exercising eminent do-
main. Financial barriers to land acquisition in depletion areas are
not so formidable as in redevelopment areas since these zones are
characterized by abandonment, weak private investment commit-
180. Id. § 5722.04.
181. Id. § 5721.19.
182. See generally 71 AM. Jumr 2d State & Local Taxation §§ 336-349, 477 (Supp.
1981).
183. S. OLSON & M. LACHMAN, supra note 174, at 15, 40.
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ment, and old and decrepit housing. These factors significantly de-
press real estate values and reduce the cost of acquisition. Initial
capital outlays may be reduced by purchasing land under install-
ment contracts.1 84 The land bank would have the benefit of imme-
diate possession and the use of more of its money for a longer pe-
riod of time. The seller would benefit by spreading his tax liability
over a number of years. Tax savings could be used as a bargaining
lever to further reduce the purchase price.18 5 To some extent, pri-
vate land owners may be less willing to resort to expensive and
time consuming litigation to stave off acquisition of their property
by the land bank because low property values create no other mar-
ket for their property. This too would expedite clearing.
Condemnation through the exercise of eminent domain is the
most crucial and controversial acquisition technique available to a
land bank.""' Eminent domain is the power inherent in a state to
take property in its jurisdiction for the public benefit. 87 Through
enabling legislation the state must give the land bank the power to
condemn land for the purpose of effectuating a program of planned
shrinkage. This power may be used to compel sale of a fee interest
or lesser estate. Without the power of eminent domain the objec-
tive of a land bank could be frustrated by property owners refusing
to sell or demanding inflated prices."8 8 Expensive and time-con-
suming court challenges to the constitutionality of a "taking" or to
the land bank's offer of "just compensation" suggest that the pow-
ers of eminent domain be exercised sparingly and only as a last
resort to oust hold-out property owners who have resisted foreclo-
sure on tax liens or offers of outright purchase.
Two important considerations which limit the use of condem-
nation powers are cost and constitutionality. Condemnation
awards based on the fair market value of the property at the time
of condemnation traditionally have not included compensation for
incidental damages suffered by the property owner. 89 Failure to
184. Public Land Banking, supra note 9, at 973.
185. See generally A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRNSFER AND FI-
NANCE, CASES AND MATERIALS 275 (1969).
186. N. ROBERTS, THE GOVERNMENT LAND DEVELOPERS 232 (1977); H. FELCHNER, supra
note 138, at 33. See generally Public Land Banking, supra note 9, at 948.
187. 1 P. NICHOLS, THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 1 (2d ed. 1917); J. LEwIs, EMINENT
DOMAN 1 (3d ed. 1909).
188. Public Land Banking, supra note 9, at 948.
189. Land Banking, supra note 136, at 795. Hagman, Planning, Condemnation, Blight,
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compensate for moving expenses, loss of business goodwill, and
rental income 90 increase the likelihood of an appeal by the land-
owner to the more sympathetic judicial system. Voluntary compen-
sation by the land bank for these incidental damages could remove
landowner reluctance to challenge the compensation. Because emi-
nent domain would be exercised to clear areas marked by high
abandonment, low rental rates, and low real estate values, this ad-
ditional compensation would not significantly increase a land
bank's acquisition costs. Expenditures could also be minimized by
using an official map to establish depletion zones. 9 1 The map stat-
ute would limit condemnation awards to the present fair market
value of buildings and structures in existence at the time the offi-
cial map was enacted unless the planning commission granted an
exception for new construction or improvements. 92 The land
bank's ability to deny compensation for unapproved construction
or improvements within depletion areas would reduce the costs of
acquiring this property by condemnation many years after the
adoption of a plan of planned shrinkage and enactment of the offi-
cial map."9"
Legal challenges to the exercise of eminent domain by land
banks are primarily constitutional in nature. The power to con-
demn is limited, by federal and state constitutions and by judicial
interpretation, to takings for public use out of public necessity.
194
The public use requirement is satisfied when land is condemned
for a project that is intended to benefit the public at large.295 This
is true even though the project is undertaken by private develop-
Participation and Just Compensation: Anglo-American Comparisons, 4 URB. L.J. 434
(1972).
190. Land Banking: New Solutions, supra note 135, at 795.
191. State ex rel. Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis.2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957). See Kucirek
& Beuscher, Wisconsin's Official Map Law, 1957 Wis. L. Rv. 176; Note, Problems of Ad-
vance Land Acquisition, 52 MmN. L. REv. 1175 (1968).
192. 2 Wis.2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957). Kirschke v. City of Houston, 330 S.W.2d 629
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (property owner alleges denial of building permit constituted a taking
of property and its beneficial uses).
193. D. MANDFLHER & G. WAITE, A STUDY OF FUTURE ACQUISITION AND RESERVATION OF
HIGHWAY RIGHTS-OF-WAY 130 (1963).
194. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See generally Public Land Banking, supra
note 9, at 948-58. Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20
B.U.L. REv. 615 (1940).
195. New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 340, 1 N.E.2d 153, 155 (1936).
See generally J. SACKMAN & P. NicHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DohwN 627 (3d ed. 1963).
See also Note, Problems of Advance Land Acquisition, supra note 191, at 1176-86.
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ers.196 The use of condemned property must bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the overall goals of a government's project.1" Courts
have attached strong presumptions of validity to legislative deter-
minations of public benefit and the means proposed to secure that
benefit. 98 It is not necessary that the public have actual access to
or use of the condemned parcel.199 Broad judicial construction of
the public use requirement has allowed condemnation of blighted
areas for slum clearance, 00 rehabilitation"1 and prevention, 0 2 and
the creation of open spaces20 3 Condemnation of a non-blighted
area for industrial redevelopment has been sanctioned by both the
Michigan Supreme Court 0 4 and the New York Court of Appeals
because the areas involved were economically deficient and im-
paired the overall growth of the community.20 5 Condemnation for
the sanctioned public purpose has met with approval even though
a private party will also, ultimately, receive an incidental bene-
fit.20 6 Planned shrinkage does not differ significantly from these
permissible public goals. Planned shrinkage benefits the public at
large by promoting efficiency in allocating scarce municipal re-
sources to maintain public services and infrastructure. By cluster-
ing the population it promotes viability. These are permissible
public purposes. It is unlikely that a court would conclude that
land banking is an unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious means of
accomplishing these goals.
196. See Conway v. Harris, 586 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1978); Moorer v. HUD, 561 F.2d 175
(8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978); Parlene Sports Co. v. Weinberger, 513
F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1975).
197. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
198. Id. at 32-33.
199. Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, supra note
194, at 618-19.
200. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
201. People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n, 14 Ill.2d 74, 150
N.E.2d 792 (1958).
202. People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago, Regional Port Dist., 41 Il.2d 363, 123 N.E.2d
92 (1954).
203. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1500 (Supp. 1981).
204. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 635, 304
N.W.2d 455, 459 (1981).
205. Cannata v. New York, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 212, 182 N.E.2d 395, 397, 227 N.Y.S.2d 903,
906 (1962).
206. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 632, 304
N.W.2d 455, 458 (1981). In Poletown it was held that the city's condemnation of land which
would eventually be conveyed to the General Motors Corporation for the construction of
new factories was an intended and legitimate objective of the legislature. Id.
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A second constitutional requirement is that of public neces-
sity.2 07 To accomplish shrinkage a land banking enabling statute
must allow land taken by eminent domain to be held in reserve for
an indefinite period of time without any specific use being desig-
nated at the time of the taking.20 8 Two problems are presented by
this language. Non-use and unspecified use are very different con-
cepts. Condemnation for unknown future uses are disallowed as
unnecessary.209 Non-use of condemned land, however, is a goal of
planned shrinkage. There is a clear public necessity for the non-
use of land. Non-use is a specific, articulable use for cleared land
and should be construed as an integral component of the shrinkage
concept. It is crucial to a favorable outcome that enabling legisla-
tion clearly state the goals of clearing.
A corrolary of the specific use requirement is the requirement
that the proposed use of the condemned land be implemented
within a reasonably specific period of time.2 0 When it is necessary
to acquire land now for a public use in the future, the question
arises of what constitutes a "reasonable" time. If non-use is
respected as a necessary means to achieve the goal of planned
shrinkage, no problem with time exists because the purpose of con-
demnation is realized at the time of the taking since services may
be withdrawn at that time. Barring this construction, planners
would have to fall back on court approved uses such as urban re-
newal or industrial redevelopment. To accomplish the immediate
goal of planned shrinkage and the ancillary goal of deferring devel-
opment until it is socially and economically sound, cities must be
allowed to wait, indefinitely if necessary, for sound redevelopment
opportunities to occur. Under a shrinkage program the future need
for condemned land is not for redevelopment per se, but only for
redevelopment capable of shouldering the entire social and eco-
207. See generally Note, Problems of Advance Land Acquisition, supra note 191, at
1177.
208. See Stone, supra note 82.
209. See Board of Education v. Baczewski, 340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W.2d 810 (1954), where
the court disallowed condemnation for a future public use which would not be affected for
thirty years or more. The court said the necessity requirement does not mean an indefinite,
remote or speculative future necessity but means a necessity now existing or to exist in the
reasonable future. Id. at 269, 65 N.W.2d at 811.
210. For a discussion on the imminence of public use and the requirements of a "rea-




nomic burden of reopening the neighborhood. A reasonable time
for redevelopment under these circumstances should be construed
leniently. In Commonwealth v. Rosso,211 the Supreme Court of Pu-
erto Rico respected this need when Puerto Rico's land banking
program was challenged.212
A final constitutional limitation to the exercise of eminent do-
main is that only that interest in property which is necessary to
accomplish the public purpose may be taken.21 3 The land bank
may not condemn more of an estate than it needs to accomplish
the clearing of depletion areas. As to vacant or unimproved prop-
erty it may be argued that the bank could only condemn develop-
ment rights or a negative easement. 214 The apparent limitation to
this proposal is that condemnation of these rights would still leave
the landowner capable of continuing a lesser use so that services
and public capital could not be withdrawn. This result would be so
contrary to the objectives of a land bank in a program of planned
shrinkage that condemnation of the entire estate would appear
justifiable.
A surge of interest in land banks by state and federal govern-
ment, planners, and academicians suggests that this land use tool
might be accepted as a means of achieving clearing. The land bank
may accomplish clearing directly, whereas other alternatives may
result in indirect and partial clearing. By clearing depletion areas
and withdrawing services and infrastructure, costs can be con-
tained and favored neighborhoods made stronger. Land banks are
ideally suited to accomplish clearing because they may purchase
real estate and hold it indefinitely.
2. Alternatives to land banking as a means of clearing
neighborhoods. Land banking is geared to accomplish two objec-
tives, clearing the population from depletion zones so that services
may be withdrawn and holding the land indefinitely until redevel-
opment is feasible. Regarding the first goal, several land use tools
are available to -accomplish indirectly what land banking may do
211. 95 P.R.R. 488 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 14 (1968).
212. Id.
213. Note, Excess Condemnation-To Take or Not to Take-A Functional Analysis,
15 N.Y.L.R. 119 (1969).
214. See State v. Larsen, 54 Wash. 2d 86, 338 P.2d 135 (1959); Rose, Psychological,
Legal and Administrative Problems of the Proposal to Use the Transfer of Development
Rights (TDR) as a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 6 URB. LAW. 919 (1974).
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directly-promote movement away from depletion areas. These
techniques do not directly clear land. Instead, they put limits on a
property owner's freedom to use his land through the adoption of a
comprehensive plan or through the imposition of use zones. An-
other alternative operates to withhold discretionary funding so
that improvements, repairs, and new construction are not afforda-
ble. Taxation may be an instrument of shrinkage if either cost
based property taxes are imposed or landowners are given a tax
break for clearing property. Code enforcement may also expedite
clearing by cracking down on substandard dwellings and facilities.
These techniques do not, however, result in property being with-
drawn from private ownership and residents evicted and relocated
as in a land banking program. Alternative land use techniques
merely make bad neighborhoods even less desirable places to live
by withdrawing public support and curtailing private land use flex-
ibility. Implementation of these alternatives is intended to have a
snowball effect on pre-existing outward migration so that the vol-
untary abandonment of these areas is accelerated.
Although these alternatives accelerate clearing in a cost free
manner, in contrast with the expense of land banking, they have
serious drawbacks. They do not preclude habitation in slum areas
and, as a result of withdrawing public support and curtailing pri-
vate land use flexibility, only make living in these areas even less
convenient and enjoyable than it already is. Complete clearing, a
necessary prerequisite to the withdrawal of services, is probably
impossible. Even if almost total clearing were to be achieved, it is
unlikely that public services could constitutionally be withdrawn
from privately held property, even if vacant. As a result the pri-
mary objective of clearing is not capable of being met. Lack of con-
trol over vast tracts of privately held, vacant land make it simi-
larily unlikely that redevelopment would occur at an optimum
time but rather indicate that trickle development in and out will
always create some demand for services and infrastructure without
a concomitant ability to pay for their maintenance. For these rea-
sons, alternatives to land banking as a means of clearing
neighborhhoods are unsatisfactory. These limitations enhance the
strength of the land banking approach to clustering and clearing.
These alternatives must be surveyed, however, because of their
value as interim clearing tools and their ability to be used in con-
junction with a program of land banking. Moreover, if land bank-
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ing is not economically or politically possible, these tools may be
employed to achieve some sort of clearing and realize a limited
savings to the city.
a. Comprehensive plan. Any type of governmental policy
statement which states or implies that some areas are viable while
others are not will promote instability in the real estate market.215
In slums and areas of high abandonment, property values may be
expected to drop even further when government declares, through
public policy statements or a municipal comprehensive plan, that:
city resources for central city revitalization are limited; different
areas of the city have unique needs and must be treated differ-
ently; and, not all areas have redevelopment potential, and there-
fore not all can be saved.216 The effect of a comprehensive plan or
redevelopment strategy that is not yet anchored to a zoning ordi-
nance, for example, because a subdivision of the city and an evalu-
ation of individual neighborhoods has not yet been undertaken, is
to promote market uncertainty in marginal .neighborhoods that
could be classified either as depletion or redevelopment zones. It is
difficult to ascertain the value of property when neighborhood sta-
tus remains uncertain. When a plan is implemented through legis-
lation, market paralysis may be expected in marginal neighbor-
hoods, making this real estate relatively worthless.217 This may
result in a bailout by both residents and property owners, such
that existing services and infrastructure could be contracted or
withdrawn.
From a constitutional standpoint, a master plan has been judi-
cially construed as having no legal effect until adopted by the gov-
erning board of the municipality in the form of a zoning ordi-
nance.21 8 Until that time, a comprehensive plan has been construed
as merely "representing the best judgment of the planning agency
as to the proper course of action to be followed." 219 Prior to legisla-
tive implementation, a comprehensive plan remains flexible and
215. Market instability caused by federal courts is discussed in Hagman & Misczynski,
The Quiet Federalization of Land Use, 9 CAun. REAL EST. 14, 16 (1975). See also Zumbrum
& Hookano, No-Growth and Related Land-Use Legal Problems: An Overview, 9 URB. LAW.
122 (1977).
216. Pratter, Strategies for City Investment, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 8.
217. See note 215 supra.
218. Cochran v. Planning Board of Summit, 87 N.J. 526, 210 A.2d 99 (1965).
219. Id. at 531, 210 A.2d at 104.
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does not bind the municipality or its residents. 220 The adoption of
a master plan does not result in a taking of private property in
violation of either the fifth or fourteenth amendments.221 For these
reasons economic uncertainty could be used by the city to acceler-
ate movement away from run down neighborhoods without run-
ning the risk of a compensable taking under the federal or state
constitutions.
b. Withholding discretionary public funds. A second type of
governmental policy statement that indirectly promotes clearing is
federal, state and municipal guidelines for allocating funds or dis-
cretionary decisions that limit public investments to viable areas.
Explicit or implicit designation of a particular area implies that
others are not viable.222 Minimum occupancy rates and real estate
values may be artificially sustained in dilapidated neighborhoods
with a high incidence of abandonment by an infusion of public
funds. A semblance of a real estate market may be present be-
cause, in buying slum area real estate, a buyer acquires two inter-
ests-the property itself and a traditional promise of public assis-
tance. A program of planned shrinkage questions whether all
neighborhoods are entitled to more than the minimum level of ser-
vice and support every citizen has a right to expect. Application of
cost-benefit analysis by city planners reflects a feeling that all
neighborhoods do not have a right to maintenance at the public
expense to the extent this is augmented by the allocation of discre-
tionary public funds. Some neighborhoods require such massive in-
fusions of public funds to counteract the accumulated effects of
abandonment and decay that the benefit to private capital invest-
ment is far exceeded by the detriment to the city, state, and fed-
eral governments of having to allocate scarce resources, more prof-
itably directed elsewhere, to provide a temporary reprieve for
terminally ill neighborhoods.
When these supplemental funds are withheld from a neighbor-
hood that has insufficient private investment or social commitment
to keep it socially and economically viable, property values and
private commitment may be expected to further deteriorate. With
the loss of discretionary public funds for construction, mainte-
220. See 87 N.J. 526, 610 A.2d 99 (1965).
221. Id.
222. Thompson, Land Management Strategies for Central City Depopulation, in 1977
Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 73 (statement by the President of the Detroit City Counsel).
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nance or improvement and loss of funds by failing to satisfy viabil-
ity requirements for mortgage insurance or subsidy programs, the
non-viability policy determination becomes a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy.223 Residence and investment made possible only by the grace
of public aid is redirected to more established areas. Private
choice, unaffected by governmental subsidies or assistance, is exer-
cised in favor of more economically, socially and aesthetically de-
sirable neighborhoods. This facilitates clustering and clearing by
accelerating movement away from depletion areas to clusters
where the withheld funds are reallocated to improve redevelop-
ment areas and maintain conservation zones. The sounder view is
to save those neighborhoods which are already strong or can be
turned around.
c. Purchase or condemnation of development rights or a
negative easement. An alternative to land banking in fee is the
purchase or condemnation of lesser estate interests such as nega-
tive easements or development rights.22 Both interests limit prop-
erty to its present use, precluding further development in the case
of negative easements225 and confining development to the holder
of development rights in the latter situation..2  The benefits of this
over acquiring an interest in fee are that the acquisition of ease-
ments and development rights is less costly, allows the land to be
retained on the tax rolls, eliminates public maintenance, and al-
lows the land to remain productive in private hands.227
Although inexpensive and non-disruptive, these two land use
tools do not solve the problem that the shrinkage concept was
designed to correct. They are incapable of clearing neighborhoods
because the landowner is entitled to continue his present use of the
underlying fee. Low profit or loss enterprises may continue to op-
erate and apartments to exist at low occupancy rates while requir-
ing that expensive services and infrastructure be provided. These
tools may, however, serve the ancillary objective of foreclosing re-
development of the area until the city feels the area can be self-
223. Id.
224. See generally Note, Problems of Advance Land Acquisition, supra note 191, at
1192-97; Wagenlander, Urban Open Space Game, 6 URB. LAW. 950, 956-58 (1974); Land
Banking: New Solutions, supra note 135, at 795-96.
225. Whyte, Securing Open Space for Urban America, Conservation Easements, in Ur-
ban Land Inst. Tech. Bull. No. 36 (1959).
226. See Rose, supra note 214, at 919.




There are problems in attempting to further either objective.
The cost of condemning a lesser interest in land that is already
developed may approximate the total value of the land so that no
savings is realized over fee simple acquisition.228 Furthermore, if a
lesser interest is condemned, rendering the remainder useless or
non-productive, the landowner could institute inverse condemna-
tion proceedings to require compensation for the whole at addi-
tional cost to the municipality.
229
d. Zoning as a tool to promote shrinkage. A property own-
er's right to use his land is subject to the paramount right of the
state to impose reasonable regulations on that use through the po-
lice power.230 Zoning may be used in a number of ways to facilitate
shrinkage. Exclusive zoning for agricultural, recreational or other
open space purposes is the most extreme means by which a munic-
ipality could use zoning to prevent redevelopment in areas of high
abandonment. Since zoning is a prospective land use control that
guides future land use rather than a retrospective one, existing oc-
cupied dwellings would have to be condoned as prior non-con-
forming uses.2 31 These hold-out uses preclude the withdrawal of
services and defeat the goal of shrinkage through clearing. As these
parcels become vacant or are amortized, they could, however, be-
come part of the open space accumulated by operation of the zon-
ing restrictions.
There are problems with zoning land for use as open space.
While this type of zoning controls future development,232 it does
not alter existing land use. In exclusive zoning for open spaces, a
higher use is zoned for future low use.2"3 The impact of exclusive
228. See Note, Problems of Advance Land Acquisition, supra note 191, at 1192-93;
Land Banking: New Solutions, supra note 135, at 796.
229. See generally Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for
Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CALn. L. REv. 2 (1970).
230. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
231. Anderson, Amortization of Non-Conforming Uses-A Preliminary Appraisal of
Harbor v. City of Buffalo, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 44 (1958).
232. ANDERSON, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 3.01-3.10 (2d ed. 1977); Hey-
man, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, in THE NEW ZONING: LE.-
GAL, AmSnTRATIvE AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 23, 24-26 (N. Marcus & M.
Groves, eds. 1970). The prospective nature of zoning is discussed in Public Land Banking,
supra note 9, at 906.
233. See Heyman, supra note 232.
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zoning is very harsh on landowners. It prohibits virtually all use
and development and significantly lowers property values. Prop-
erty owners will inevitably challenge open space zoning on equal
protection grounds as an unreasonable and impermissible exercise
of police power because it impacts on a suspect classification or
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental freedom.2 " Two dif-
ferent standards of review apply, depending on whether the land-
owners allege discrimination on the basis of wealth or, as in many
central city areas, race. The rational basis test, which presumes
constitutionality,235 is the standard which applies to most social
and economic legislation. 23 6 Planned shrinkage to reduce municipal
costs and increase neighborhood viability is a valid police power
objective. Whether zoning is a valid means of achieving this socio-
economic objective is questionable. If any facts can be shown that
make the choice of zoning a reasonable means of achieving the ob-
jective of shrinkage, then, under the rational basis test, the ordi-
nance will be upheld.237 If the landowners allege that the ordinance
discriminates on the basis of race, because it operates dispropor-
tionately against minority landowners or that its dislocationary ef-
fects disproportionately affect minorities, then it would have to
withstand strict scrutiny under the compelling state interest
test.238 The likelihood of the ordinance being upheld under this
standard is remote since the municipality would have to prove that
the desired shrinkage cannot be achieved through any other means
that do not work the same discrimination. 2 " Although all clearing
techniques result in the dislocation of large numbers of poor, and
probably minorities, voluntary clustering techniques such as relo-
cation benefits achieve a similar result without a constitutional
taint.
Another constitutional challenge threatens the success of open
land zoning. This is the due process claim that open space zoning
results in a taking of private property without just compensa-
234. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
235. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
236. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972) (no discrim-
ination on the basis of wealth alone).
237. 291 U.S. 502.
238. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
239. United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project v. City of Del Ray, 493 F.2d 799 (5th
Cir. 1974)(municipal services cannot be refused individuals outside of municipal boundaries
on the basis of race).
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tion.24° Resolution of this allegation requires a careful balancing of
competing interests. On one hand, courts recognize that private
property interests must occasionally yield for the benefit of the
general public. An open space zoning approach to shrinkage works
hardship on a few individuals, but the benefits inure to all city
residents and state and federal taxpayers, to the extent these levels
of government are called upon to aid deteriorating cities. On the
other hand, it is beyond the permissible scope of the police power
to restrict the use and limit the development of land to the point
where it is economically worthless.241 To make shrinkage work,
land would have to be cleared and services withdrawn. This would
preclude virtually all uses but recreation and would assuredly be
construed as a compensable taking. Down zoning and attempts at
open space zoning have already given rise to several successful in-
verse condemnation lawsuits.242 "Zoning to decrease the cost of fu-
ture land acquisition has also met with judicial disapproval. 2 4 3
However, in the landmark open zoning case of Agins v. City of
Tiburton,24 the Supreme Court held that a zoning ordinance
which limited the use of land to single family dwellings, accessory
buildings, and open space uses was facially constitutional and not a
taking under the Fifth Amendment.24 The court did not consider
whether the zoning ordinance would be unconstitutional if applied
to prevent maximum development of the land for single family
dwellings.246
The use of more typical restrictions to curb existing use, such
as large lot sizes, area minimums based on occupancy, set backs,
and use prohibitions present the same problems as open space zon-
240. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
241. Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See Note, New
York's Changing Conceptions of Land Use Law: Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 157 (1978).
242. Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976). See
also Zumbrum & Hookano, supra note 215, at 153-56.
243. Note, Problems of Advance Land Acquisition, supra note 191, at 1186. See also
City of Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (1961)(zoning
to depress land values to facilitate future exercise of eminent domain held unreasonable).
244. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
245. Id. at 259. The Supreme Court recognized that open space zoning served a legiti-
mate government interest by discouraging the premature and unnecessary conversion of
open space'land to urban uses. Id. at 261.
246. Id. at 259.
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ing and are less effective in promoting clearing.
Zoning is not a satisfactory means of achieving the primary
goal of shrinkage, clearing land, and withdrawing services. It does
serve the ancillary goal of redevelopment very effectively. Once
clearing is achieved by other means the land could be rezoned to
suit residential, commercial, and industrial demand and be re-
stricted to promote orderly and aesthetically pleasing regrowth. A
redevelopment strategy tied to zoning could condition redevelop-
ment on the availability of modern, cost-efficient services.241 7 In
Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo,248 approval to develop was
linked to the availability of adequate public services.249 Developers
considering cleared central city areas would have to await a thresh-
old level of support services and facilities or agree to construct
some infrastructure themselves. Public reinvestment in facilities
would be modern, cost-efficient, and tailored to the new use being
made of the area. Specialized capital improvements could lure spe-
cific industries into the area to enhance the economic base.250 In
Ramapo the court found that the restriction conditioning develop-
ment on the availability of services was not a taking because the
restriction was temporary.2 1 If a land bank owns the cleared land
a Ramapo-type plan is not necessary because an objective of the
bank is to control the timing of redevelopment.252 If cleared land
remains in private ownership, either because of the chilling effects
of a comprehensive plan on property values or because of tax in-
centives to hold land as open space, then a zoning ordinance such
as Ramapo's would be of questionable value in promoting ordered
and sound regrowth. "A temporary restriction promising that the
247. See Pratter, Strategies for City Investment, in 1977 Comm. Prin, supra note 1, at
85-86.
248. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972). See Blumstein, A Prolegomenon to Growth Management and Exclusion-
ary Zoning Issues, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 38 (1979). In Ramapo the five essential
services or facilities were drainage systems, sewers, parks, schools and recreational areas,
and roads and firehouses. A permit could be issued after 15 development points were accu-
mulated. 30 N.Y.2d at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
249. 30 N.Y.2d at 368,. 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
250. See Deutch, Capital Improvement Controls as Land Use Devices, 9 ENVT'L L. 61
(1978); Hirst & Hirst, Capital Facilities Planning as A Growth Tool, in 2 URB. LAND INST.
461 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
251. 30 N.Y.2d at 366-68, 379, 285 N.E.2d at 294-96, 296, 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142-43,
154.
252. Public Land Banking, supra note 9, at 929-30.
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property may be put to profitable use within a reasonable time '"25 3
may force the city to provide services before sufficient redevelop-
ment interest is generated to justify the expenditures. For these
reasons zoning is of limited value in furthering the shrinkage of
central cities.
e. Taxation as a means of promoting clearing. Real estate
taxes have a tremendous impact on the way land is used.2 54 There
are two ways the power to tax may be used by a municipality as a
planning tool to encourage clustering and clearing. Cost based
property taxes, utility charges, and other user costs could be im-
posed on a city-wide basis.255 People living in low density areas,
where the cost of delivering services and maintaining infrastruc-
ture is high, would pay proportionately higher taxes and user
fares.256 By making each neighborhood bear its own costs, disincen-
tives to sprawl would exist with respect to low density neighbor-
hoods.257 This sprawling, however, occurs in very different parts of
the city and has very different socio-economic consequences. The
low density areas of the city are the repositories of the poor, who
cannot be expected to financially shoulder premium costs for the
efficient delivery of services in their low density neighborhoods.
The other low density neighborhoods are at city edges, close to the
suburban rings. These households are more capable of handling
premium charges and may be able to rationalize them better since
the added amenities of these quasi-suburban neighborhoods, such
as better schools and larger homes, may make the added costs
worthwhile.
Imposition of such taxes on low density central city neighbor-
hoods would raise the cost of home ownership, rental or doing bus-
iness in these areas. Unlike homes on the suburban fringe, no
countervailing benefits are realized by remaining in these areas.
Since incomes are low, cost based property taxes and other charges
that would increase the cost of living would encourage clustering in
higher density areas and clearing out low density ones. Disadvan-
253. Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 380, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 154.
"254. See generally Hagman, Open Space Planning and Property Taxation-Some
Suggestions, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 628.
255. Thompson, Land Management Strategies for Central City Depopulation, in 1977
Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 73-75.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 73.
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tages are that the high cost of residence on the city fringe, due to
high land values and premium charges for low density services, en-
hance the difficulties of moving to better areas near the suburban
fringe.258 This locks the poor more soundly into the central city at
the expense of a socio-economic and racial mix in outlying areas.
In short, cost based property taxes operate unevenly to promote.
clustering only by the poor who are unable to pay the same premi-
ums their low density suburban neighbors do.
Tax breaks, such as general directive, tax preference, or tax
deferral, may encourage the use of central city land for undevel-
oped open spaces.259 As a general rule, property is assessed and
taxed for its highest and best use.260 In central city areas where
abandonment and decay is prevalent, failure of the market de-
stroys the development potential of land. Landowners are forced to
pursue inappropriate and unprofitable uses to defray the cost of
their tax burdens. By reducing the tax on open spaces the
financially and socially desirable goal of clearing may be met. Tax
reduction could be based on an arbitrary reduction of the assessed
valuation on use as open space, "as restricted by zoning, contract,
scenic easements or restrictive convenants. 2 e1 Public resistance to
non-development controls may be expected unless they are accom-
panied by advantageous tax treatment.26 2 Owners of dilapidated
and unprofitable real estate, relieved of the need to pursue im-
proper or unprofitable uses to generate income to offset "highest
and best use" tax and other liabilities, could profitably demolish
any structures and hold the land as open space until redevelop-
ment is economically feasible.
If central city land is subject to'zoning restrictions, private
covenants, or negative easements, either a general directive or tax
preference may be used to foster clearing.263 Tax assessors presume
that restricted land will be relieved of its burdens if the market
258. Id. at 73-74.
259. Hagman, supra note 254, at 633-45. The tax system has frequently been invoked
to achieve public policy objectives. Id.
260. See e.g., MICH. CONST. art. VI. See also NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY
AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION 603,605-06 (1959)(requires full value, market value, true
value, etc.); Wagenlander, supra note 224, at 964; Hagman, supra note 254, at 641.
261. Wagenlander, supra note 224, at 965.
262. Hagman, supra note 254, at 657.
263. Both of these taxing methods take into account present low use and restrictions on
use in making an assessment. See Hagman, supra note 254, at 633-34.
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can accommodate more intensive uses.264 Even though land is pres-
ently limited in its use it is taxed as though it were uncontrolled.16
If land is zoned for recreational uses, but taxed as though it were
zoned for commercial, the assessment creates financial burdens on
the landowner to rezone to a higher, more profitable use which
tends, in itself, to break down the existing zoning use.266 A general
directive requires that assessors consider the restrictions perma-
nent and levy tax accordingly. 2 7 A lower assessment eliminates the
need to convert property to more intensive, but inappropriate uses
to pay property taxes. With land taxed at its present use rather
than at an increased value due to development potential, constitu-
tional problems of just valuation are avoided. 6 8 Constitutional
problems with special classifications or partial exemptions are
avoided because there is no classification of land by use, only an
awareness on the part of assessors that certain high intensity uses
are prohibited because present restrictions do not allow them.2 °
Land restricted to use as open space precludes virtually all uses. It
would be assessed very low because its redevelopment potential
may not be taken into account under a general directive. Landown-
ers engaged in unprofitable uses could demolish structures and en-
joy tax relief while waiting for suitable redevelopment opportuni-
ties. This would expedite clearing in slum neighborhoods and
clustering in viable ones. Incentives to prematurely redevelop
would be diminished by the imposition of substantially higher
taxes for uses of the land other than open space. Only economically
profitable redevelopment could bear the additional tax burden.
Preferential taxation is available to keep open land in its pre-
sent state by reducing the tax burden for land restricted to specific
classifications of use.270 There is no assumption that the land is
permanently restricted in its use. 7 1 A specific grant of tax relief for
open land use is subject to constitutional challenge on the ground
that it is an unreasonable classification and partial exemption from
264. Id. at 633.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 638.
267. Id. at 641-42.
268. State Tax Comm'n v. Wakefield, 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1960). See Hagman,
supra note 254, at 641-42.
269. Hagman, supra note 254, at 641-42.
270. Id. at 639-40, 642-45.
271. Id. at 639.
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state requirements of uniformity in taxation.272 If a state becomes
sufficiently involved in solving the problems of its large cities, this
potential constitutional challenge could be avoided by amending
its constitution.2 73 The same clustering and clearing results could
be accomplished as with a general directive.
A tax deferral allows land to be assessed at its present low
intensity or restricted use.274 Subsequent higher or more intense
use subjects the property to an additional tax based on the market
value of the land as a high intensity use, retroactive to the imposi-
tion of the tax deferral program . 5 The total tax recovered is equal
to the sum of the tax that would have been paid had the land been
used at its highest and best use for the entire period.278 The advan-
tage to land owners is that they only pay partial tax so long as the
lesser uses are engaged in. The remainder of the tax liability is
deferred indefinitely until the use is changed. A drawback is that
in long periods of low intensity use, a backlog of tax liability builds
up so that an eventual change of use which triggers collection of
the deferred remainder of tax liability may be so great that the
owner is unable to pay it.2 77 In a program of planned shrinkage this
result is desirable because it retards redevelopment of open spaces
until a strong market demand for the real estate improves central
city values to the point that owners can sell or lease their property
for a price in excess of the outstanding back taxes.
f. Building, safety and health code enforcement. Building,
safety, and health code enforcement may be used to clear depletion
zones. Obsolete structures with poor maintenance typify depletion
areas. Code infractions may be expected to increase with the age of
the building and neighborhood. Abandonment could be accelerated
by strict code enforcement since the resources necessary to bring
buildings in compliance with the codes are not available.2 8 Inspec-
tors have the authority to close down buildings where the code vio-
lations are so numerous or serious that they imperil the life or
272. State Tax Comm'n v. Wakefield, 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1960) (state constitu-
tion does not permit special assessment for land used only for agriculture).
273. This was done in both California and Maryland. See CAL. CONST. art. 28, § 2; MD.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 5 (1980). See also Wagenlander, supra note 224, at 965.
274. Hagman, supra note 254, at 638-39, 645.
275. Id. at 638-39.
276. Id. at 639.
277. Id.
278. Pratter, Strategies for City Investment, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 87.
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safety of a dwelling's inhabitants. Evicted owners or tenants must
relocate elsewhere. Strict code enforcement can be used to elimi-
nate substandard structures and promote clearing so that services
may be withdrawn. Code enforcement is state action which bears a
reasonable relation to valid police power objectives, even though it
may be used as a tool in implementing socio-economic policy.2 70
Code enforcement may be used to maintain high standards in
conservation areas.280 Maintenance may be fostered by correcting
signs of deterioration and age as they occur. Ironically, in St. Louis
code enforcement was strict in conservation areas, but lax as a
matter of public policy in areas of high abandonment.2 81
g. Federal environmental legislation as a tool to retard re-
development. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,282
the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,283 and the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 28 do not promote clearing, the
primary goal of planned shrinkage. This environmental legislation
does, however, have an effect on the ancillary goal of redevelop-
ment. The acts superimpose federal regulations on local and state
land use controls. Compliance with the high standards for air and
water quality increase the cost of redevelopment or preclude it al-
together where the environment would be irreparably compro-
mised by yet another source of air or water effluent.288 Further, the
acts require environmental impact statements which may reduce
redevelopment by drowning it in a sea of costly and burdensome
procedural requirements.288 Only developers with strong reinvest-
ment commitments would be able to absorb the cost of compliance;
impractical or unprofitable projects are likely to be scrapped at the
planning stages. Developers who have the commitment and re-
sources to surpass these predevelopment barriers will have a
greater incentive to make their investments pay off. These well
planned and financed developments will warrant the reopening of
cleared neighborhoods.
279. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
280. Pratter, Strategies for City Investment, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 82.
281. Id. at 87.
282. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (Supp. 1980).
283. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857(b) (Supp. 1980).
284. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1980).
285. Id. § 13il.




Our large cities are losing population and, consequently, reve-
nues. Many of those left behind are the urban poor who cost more
in services than they contribute in revenues. Cities face huge defi-
cits in their budgets for many reasons. Renewed efforts must be
made to bring city expenditures in line with revenues. A program
of planned shrinkage, where central city populations can be per-
suaded to move away from sparsely populated areas and into high
density conservation and redevelopment areas would allow services
and facilities to be withdrawn from cleared areas and reallocated
more efficiently to cluster areas. The clearing of land can best be
accomplished by land banking. Other land-use controls are inade-
quate to accomplish shrinkage, although they may be of some as-
sistance if the area is eventually redeveloped.
Despite the economic benefits of planned shrinkage and the
feasibility of implementing such a program with existing legal
tools, the ultimate test of the practicality of planned shrinkage is a
political one., Plans aimed at relocating central city residents have
been decried as inhuman, racist, and assaults against the poor. In
excising soft spots from the city's economic base, critics have
charged that planned shrinkage "places the burden of reinvest-
ment and relocation on those least able to afford it. ' '287 Despite
political and humanitarian objectives, some tough new answers are
needed to curb the decline that plagues these cities.
287. Pratter, Strategies for City Investment, in 1977 Comm. Print, supra note 1, at 87.
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